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Abstract
This report covers regulatory control of nuclear safety in 2002. Its submission to the
Ministry of Trade and Industry by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is
stipulated in section 121 of the Nuclear Energy Decree. Nuclear safety regulation focused
on the operation of Finnish nuclear facilities as well as on nuclear waste management and
nuclear materials.
No events occurred at the nuclear power plants that would have endangered the safe use
of nuclear energy. No significant events occurred at the research reactor either. The doses
of all nuclear power plant workers were below the individual dose limit. The collective
occupational dose was low internationally. Radioactive releases were low and the dose
calculated on their basis for the most exposed individual in the vicinity of Loviisa and
Olkiluoto nuclear power plants was well below the limit established by the Government.
In addition, occupational radiation doses at the research reactor and radioactive releases
from it into the environment were well below set limits.
The regulation of nuclear waste management focused on spent fuel storage and final
disposal plans as well as the treatment, storage and final disposal of reactor waste. No
events occurred in nuclear waste management that would have endangered safety. In the
field of nuclear material safeguards, the use of nuclear materials in accordance with
current regulations and the completeness and correctness of nuclear material accounting
were verified.
The operation of Finnish nuclear power plants, nuclear waste management and the use of
nuclear materials complied with current rules and regulations, as verified by regulation.
In addition, STUK verified that nuclear liability in the event of nuclear damage has been
taken care of according to legislation.
The total costs of nuclear safety regulation in 2002 were 7.6 M€. The total costs of opera-
tions subject to a charge were 6.1 M€, the full amount of which was charged to the licen-
sees and licence-applicants.
TOSSAVAINEN Kirsti (ed.). Regulatory control of nuclear safety in Finland. Annual report 2002.
STUK-B-YTO 224. Helsinki 2003. 41 pp. + Appendices 22 pp.
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The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority
(STUK) regulates the use of nuclear energy in Fin-
land as prescribed in the Nuclear Energy Act (990/
1987). STUK’s responsibilities also include control
of physical protection, and emergency planning as
well as control of the use of nuclear energy neces-
sary to prevent nuclear proliferation. This is a re-
port on regulatory control in the field of nuclear
energy submitted by STUK to the Ministry of
Trade and Industry once a year as stipulated in
section 121 of the Nuclear Energy Decree.
It covers the regulatory control of nuclear facil-
ities, nuclear waste management and nuclear ma-
terials, which is the task of the STUK Depart-
ments of Nuclear Waste and Materials Regulation
(YMO) and Nuclear Reactor Regulation (YTO).
The report’s section dealing with the regulation
of nuclear facilities describes plant operation and
operational events as well as safety improve-
ments. It also addresses radiation safety by giving
occupational radiation doses, collective doses and
1 Preface
release data as well as environmental radiation
monitoring results.
The nuclear waste management section dis-
cusses the final disposal of nuclear fuel and reac-
tor waste treatment. It gives the end-of-year vol-
umes of nuclear fuel and reactor waste stored at
the plant sites.
Nuclear material safeguards at Finnish nucle-
ar facilities and regulation of radioactive materi-
als transport are described as well.
The report gives STUK’s indicators describing
regulatory activities and the safety performance of
nuclear power plants.
In addition, the report discusses the develop-
ment of regulatory guides and some support func-
tions in nuclear safety regulation, such as safety
research, emergency preparedness, communica-
tion and development projects. Participation in
international co-operation in the field of nuclear
safety is described as well.
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2.1 Safety and performance indicators
Nuclear safety regulation mostly focused on the
Loviisa 1 and 2 nuclear power plant units owned
by Fortum Power and Heat Oy and the Olkiluoto 1
and 2 units owned by Teollisuuden Voima Oy as
well as on their nuclear waste management and
nuclear materials. The planning and later imple-
mentation of the final disposal of nuclear fuel,
which is part of nuclear waste management, is
taken care of by Posiva Oy. Subject to regulatory
control were also the research reactor operated by
the Technical Research Centre of Finland, the
small-scale users of nuclear materials as well as
the transport of radioactive materials. In addition,
matters relating to the fifth reactor in planning
were dealt with.
STUK has a safety and performance indicator
system for acquiring data and trends on the devel-
opment of regulated activities. Indicators are used
to follow the effectiveness and efficiency of regula-
tory activities. The indicator system is given in
Appendix 1. This chapter describes the indicators
on regulatory efficiency; the indicators on regula-
tory effectiveness are described in Chapter 4.
The duty area of nuclear safety regulation
included basic operations subject and not subject
to a charge. Basic operations subject to a charge
were mostly comprised of the regulatory control of
nuclear facilities, with their costs charged to those
subject to control. Those basic operations not sub-
ject to a charge included international and domes-
tic co-operation as well as emergency response
and communications. Basic operations not subject
to a charge are publicly funded. The overheads
due to rule-making and support functions (admin-
istration, development projects in support of regu-
latory activities, training, maintenance and devel-
opment of expertise, reporting as well as contribu-
tion to nuclear safety research) were carried for-
2 Nuclear safety regulation
ward into the costs of both types of basic operation
and of contracted services in relation to the
number of working hours spent on each function.
The distribution of working hours of the regu-
latory personnel in each duty area is given in
Table I.
The time spent on the inspection and review of
Loviisa nuclear power plant was 12.1 man-years,
which is 14.8 % of the total working time of the
regulatory personnel. The time spent on Olkiluoto
nuclear power plant was 12.4 man-years, i.e. 15.1%
of total working time. These figures include not
only regulation of the nuclear power plants but
also nuclear material regulation. The time spent
on nuclear waste management regulation was 2.3
man-years, i.e. 2.8% of total working time. The
inspection and review of the FiR 1 research reac-
tor took 0.1 man-years and the compiling of a
preliminary safety evaluation and the preparing
for the regulatory control of the fifth reactor in
planning 0.8 man-years. The regulatory control of
small-scale users of nuclear materials took 0.01
man-years. Fig. 1 gives the distribution of working
time spent on the main functions in 1998–2002.
The number of inspection days onsite and at
the component manufacturers’ premises totalled
679. In addition to inspections focusing on the
safety of domestic nuclear power plants, the figure
includes nuclear waste management and nuclear
materials inspections. Two resident inspectors
worked at Olkiluoto nuclear power plant and one
at Loviisa plant. The number of inspection days
for 1998–2002 is given in Fig. 2.
The total number of documents submitted to
STUK for review in 2002 was 1486. The number of
documents submitted in 2002 and earlier, whose
review was completed in 2002, was 1519. The
figure includes licences granted by STUK in ac-
cordance with the Nuclear Energy Act, which are
S T U K - B - Y TO 2 2 4
9
Table I. Distribution of working hours of the regulatory personnel in each duty area.
Duty area 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Basic operations subject to a charge 24.7 25.3 26.4 26.3 27.6
Basic operations not subject to a charge 4.6 5.5 7.5 7.4 6.9
Contracted services 6.9 7.0 5.4 4.4 3.8
Rule-making and support functions 25.1 24.6 25.5 28.5 27.1
Holidays and absences 13.9 14.8 15.0 16 16.2
Total 75.2 77.2 79.8 82.6 81.6
Figure 1. Working time spent on main functions.
Figure 2. Number of inspection days onsite and at component manufacturers’ premises.
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Figure 3. Number of documents received and reviewed as well as average document review time.
Figure 4. Distribution of time spent on preparing
decisions about the Loviisa plant units.
Figure 5. Distribution of time spent on preparing
decisions about the Olkiluoto plant units.
4.7
5.1 5.2
5.8
6.1
4.7
5.1 5.2
5.8
6.1
5.4
6.1
6.5
7.2
7.6
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
M€
Regulatory control income Costs of regulatory control subject to a charge Regulatory control total costs
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listed in Appendix 2. Average document review
time was 57 days. The yearly number of docu-
ments and their average review times in 1998–
2002 are given in Fig. 3. Figs 4 and 5 give the
distribution of the review times of documents on
Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants.
2.2 Finances
In 2002, the costs of the regulatory control of nu-
clear safety subject to a charge were 6.1 M€. The
total costs of nuclear safety regulation were 7.6
M€. Thus the share of activities subject to a charge
was 81%.
The 2002 income from nuclear safety regula-
tion was 6.1 M€. Of this, 2.5 M€ and 2.7 M€ came
from the inspection and review of Loviisa and
Olkiluoto nuclear power plants, respectively. The
regulation of Posiva Oy’s operations yielded
0.8 M€. The income from other objects of regula-
tion (i.a. regulation of the FiR 1 research reactor,
preparation of a preliminary safety evaluation for
and preparation of the regulatory control of the
fifth reactor in planning, regulation of small-scale
users of nuclear materials) was 0.1 M€. Figure 6
gives the annual income and costs of nuclear
safety regulation in 1998–2002.
2.3 Development projects
Development of own operation
The development of STUK’s own operation focused
on two themes: processes and competence. Proc-
esses were the object of development in the whole
of STUK. During 2002 the nuclear safety regula-
tion processes were identified, a process map was
drawn up, process owners were assigned, and proc-
ess descriptions were initiated. In the next phase,
a renewed process-based management system is
due for implementation.
In the first phase of the competence analysis,
the target state and current state of substance
competence directly pertaining to nuclear safety
regulation were analysed. In the second phase, the
state of “general competence”, shared by all STUK
employees, was analysed. The analysis results will
be utilised in competence management and in
particular in internal training and new employee
orientation.
A project involving regulation of the fifth reac-
tor in planning was prepared for by setting up a
project group to co-ordinate regulatory activities
and by drawing up a draft project plan. Experienc-
es gained from the project will be utilised in other
regulatory work as well.
A set of indicators in accordance with the BSC
Model was introduced for evaluation of own opera-
tion. As regards the indicators, international co-
operation in two OECD/NEA working groups was
continued.
Development of information management
The development of information management per-
taining to nuclear safety regulation was contin-
ued. The focus in 2002 was in the practical testing
of portals suitable for information management.
In early 2002, testing of the Sharepoint Portal
Server (SPS) software was completed and after
that the SAP Enterprise Portal software was test-
ed at STUK. In spring 2003, when the testing will
be over, the final choice for STUK’s information
management portal will be made.
A uniform documents management project plan
was drawn up for STUK into which are gathered
all on-going or planned information management
related development projects of STUK’s depart-
ments. The project is headed by STUK’s informa-
tion management director whose office was estab-
lished in early 2002. Similarly, the IT support and
development personnel of STUK’s departments
were moved in early 2003 to the Information
Management Unit directly subordinate to the
head of information management.
In addition to the software comparisons and
tests made, discussions with the licensees about
the implementation of shared “Extranet solutions”
were continued. All technical basic documents for
Loviisa facility, which inspectors can now access
on STUK’s Intranet were provided by Fortum
Power and Heat Oy. The data communications
links to STUK’s Helsinki Intranet, used by STUK’s
resident inspectors who work at the plant sites
and by other personnel, were upgraded and made
faster by new technical solutions.
A significant part of the computer equipment
used by the inspectors was upgraded and, by the
end of 2002, almost all of them were using the Win
2000 operating system. Browser-based user-inter-
faces for use on STUK’s Intranet were developed
for several earlier-established data bases.
12
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Safety culture
STUK’s objective is to develop safety culture in
Finland to cover the whole of the nuclear field.
STUK met with the licensees to discuss impor-
tant, safety culture related issues. The meeting
was based on data yielded by a study commis-
sioned by STUK and the discussions aimed at
establishing a common view of the contents of
Finland’s national safety culture. A common basis
for the discussion was that the safety liability of
the licensees is indivisible. STUK is developing its
guidelines and regulatory procedures to facilitate
the setting of requirements such that the licen-
sees’ liabilities are unambiguous and that suffi-
cient documentation avoiding bureaucracy is as-
sured. This is a challenge even for the licensees.
Change of generation, updating of know-how and
maintenance of personnel motivation place great
challenges on all organisations in the nuclear field
and require enhancement of work, work environ-
ment, equipment and procedures as well as per-
sonnel participation. The discussion was consid-
ered productive and plans are to resume it in the
coming years.
Finnish safety authorities continued to discuss
safety-culture related questions. On STUK’s initi-
ative, five meetings were held, which, in addition
to STUK, were attended by the representatives of
the Civil Aviation Administration, the Finnish
Maritime Administration, the Finnish Rail Admin-
istration, the Safety Technology Authority TUKES
and the occupational safety unit of the Ministry of
Social Affairs and Health. The discussions dealt
with the regulatory bases and practical proce-
dures of the above authorities concerning manage-
ment of safety and safety culture.
Development of risk-informed regulation
In 2002 the essential elements of risk-informed
regulation were identified and the regulatory ef-
fort was focused on the most risk-significant ob-
jects.
Requirements pertaining to risk-informed safe-
ty management at nuclear power plants are set
forth in Guide YVL 2.8. The new guide sets partic-
ularly detailed requirements for the probabilistic
safety analysis (PSA) of the design phase and for
risk-informed safety management. Even before,
the PSA has been widely used to assess modifica-
tions and justify applications for exemptions from
the Technical Specifications. In addition, the guide
requires that the PSA be used to assess the need
to modify the Technical Specifications and safety
classification, to evaluate system and component
testing programmes, to assess the risk-importance
of preventive maintenance and to develop periodic
inspection programmes of piping, for example.
Even STUK’s regulatory control activities have
a risk-informed focus, which has been taken into
account while reviewing the YVL guides. In the
revised Guide YVL 2.0, which is about nuclear
power plant systems design, the consideration and
assessment of safety principles as early as possi-
ble in the design phase in connection with the
conceptual design plans is underlined. The same
principle is applied in Guides YVL 5.2 and YVL 5.5,
which are about the electrical and I&C systems of
nuclear facilities. In addition, the principles of
regulatory control that apply to pressure equip-
ment as well as to electrical and I&C components
are redefined in the YVL guides. At component
level, STUK’s control focuses on the working of the
licensee and the independent inspection organisa-
tion; only the most important components are
inspected by STUK.
The risk-informed focusing of STUK’s regulato-
ry effort continues in connection with the develop-
ment of YVL guides and STUK’s quality manage-
ment system and processes.
In addition to technical oversight, oversight of
the functioning of the utilities’ organisations, as
carried out in particular in connection with in-
spections contained in the periodic inspections
programme and during event investigation, was
emphasised in regulatory work. At component
level, work focused on safety-significant failures,
common-cause failures and recurrent failures, uti-
lising STUK’s safety and performance indicators.
To develop functional processes, anticipatory year-
ly collective assessments pertaining to the opera-
tion of nuclear power plants are employed in the
planning of regulatory activities.
S T U K - B - Y TO 2 2 4
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The revision and updating of YVL guides contin-
ued. The guides are detailed safety regulations for
nuclear facilities issued by STUK on the basis of
the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) and the Gov-
ernment Resolution (395/1991) on the general
safety regulations for nuclear power plants. The
guides describe STUK’s regulatory procedures as
well. STUK decides, case by case, how new guides
apply to facilities already in operation.
A total of about 45 guides were prepared or
reviewed in YVL guide working groups, with ten
guides completed by the end of 2002. The number
of Finnish language YVL guides published in
1998–2002 is given in Fig. 7. Seven guides were
published in English and three in Swedish. The
guides were issued in print and on the Internet.
The project for the revision of rule making
strategy, started in 2001, was revised by incorpo-
rating the principles of YVL guide revision in the
STUK strategy and also in a separate action plan
for guidelines. At departmental level, only a sepa-
rate, guide-specific work plan will be drawn up.
After the Parliament’s decision to leave in force
the Government’s decision-in-principle approving
the construction of a fifth nuclear power plant, an
assessment was made of the most significant
needs for change for consideration in the revision
of YVL guides in the near future. This assessment
was sent to the licensees for information. Specific
memoranda were prepared on three guides deal-
ing with safety classification, failure criteria and
physical protection. Described in detail was the
interpretation of the requirements of the guides to
clarify design criteria for the fifth plant in plan-
ning in particular.
3 Regulatory guides
Figure 7. Number of published YVL guides.
In 2002 STUK did not prepare any significant
amendments to the Nuclear Energy Act or Decree,
nor did any such take force in Finland. No amend-
ments were prepared to the general nuclear safety
requirements, given in the form of Government
Resolutions, either. Nuclear safety recommenda-
tions are also given by international organisa-
tions, such as the EU, the IAEA, the OECD/NEA
and the national authorities of various countries.
They did not give any cause to update the Fin-
land’s nuclear legislation.
STUK prepared to the IAEA national state-
ments on eight draft safety guides.
In early 2002 the Commission of the European
Communities sent to the Member States for com-
ment a proposal for a new safeguards regulation.
The revision of the Regulation (Euratom 3227/76),
mainly dated from the year 1957, has become
topical due to safeguards control in accordance
with the Model Protocol Additional, the expansion
of the EU and the modernisation of the reporting
format. STUK actively contributed to the work of
the Atomic Questions Group (AQG). Work will
continue in 2003.
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2.1 Nuclear safety regulation
The regulatory control of nuclear power plants
comprised periodic inspections, plant modifica-
tions oversight, event investigation and inspec-
tions the licensee was obliged to separately re-
quest during measures carried out at the plant, or
that STUK conducted at its discretion. In addition,
STUK assessed the safety of the nuclear power
plants on the basis of, among others, operating
experience, safety analyses as well as reports and
plans submitted by the licensee, and by inspec-
tions onsite and at component manufacturers’
premises.
Regulation showed that the plants were oper-
ated in compliance with the regulations.
Periodic inspections
In 2002 there were 12 periodic inspections at Lovi-
isa plant and 14 at Olkiluoto plant. The plants’
management and procedures, the functioning of
their organisational units and the technical ac-
ceptability of their systems were looked into. How
the contents of licensee documents correspond to
regulations and also that licensee operations com-
ply with own quality management systems, among
others, were verified by the inspections. The in-
spections comprised interviews with the plant per-
sonnel, document reviews and walk rounds to ver-
ify facts and oversee tests, among others. As a
rule, inspections in accordance with the pro-
gramme are repeated yearly; the contents of indi-
vidual inspections vary yearly, however. The annu-
al inspection programme was brought to the
knowledge of the licensees in early 2002 and in-
spection dates were agreed upon with the repre-
sentatives of the licensees.
STUK presented 54 requirements based on the
inspections. Measures have been, and will be,
taken at Loviisa and Olkiluoto plants to correct
detected shortcomings. None of the observations
made by STUK would have essentially affected
the safety of the plant units.
Inspections contained in the periodic inspec-
tion programme are listed in Appendix 3.
Plant modifications
The regulatory control of plant modifications com-
prised the following: definition of the scope of reg-
ulatory control, review of modification documents,
and supervision of the implementation and com-
missioning of modifications. Modifications to im-
prove plant safety are described in sub-sections
4.2.4 and 4.3.4 and Appendix 4.
STUK oversaw the implementation of compo-
nent and structural modifications by inspections
onsite and at component manufacturers’ premises
and by licensee reports. In consequence of the
modifications several documents on plant opera-
tion and layout, such as the Technical Specifica-
tions, the Final Safety Analysis Report and operat-
ing procedures were revised. STUK reviewed
these document revisions and generally followed
the updating of plant documentation after the
modifications.
One part of regulation were meetings between
STUK and the licensee. In the meetings licensee’s
representatives clarified planned modifications,
those due in the next annual maintenance outage
and those to be implemented in the long-run as
well as the status of ongoing modification projects.
In 2001 a new practice was started at STUK, with
the arrangement of internal follow-up meetings on
modifications. Modifications under review at
STUK and those to be reviewed later plus their
status as regards their planned date of implemen-
tation were discussed at the meetings. In 2002
there was one such meeting per each plant site.
The progression of safety-significant modifica-
tions was followed in a computer-based plant
modifications register. In 2002 the number of
4 Nuclear facilities regulation
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modifications entered in the register was 12. Nu-
merous unfinished modifications, registered in
earlier years, were monitored by means of the
register as well. The plant modifications register
was utilised specifically in monitoring the realisa-
tion of modification-related document amend-
ments. As a result of the follow-up it was noted
that document changes made after plant modifica-
tions in 2001, and monitored in the plant modifica-
tions register, were completed as follows: 77% at
Olkiluoto plant and 81% at Loviisa plant by the
next annual maintenance. All modifications to the
Technical Specifications were carried out at both
plant sites prior to the implementation of each
modification.
Annual maintenance outages
During annual maintenance outages regulatory
control focused on, among others, work adminis-
tration during outages, the activities of the operat-
ing and maintenance personnel, refuelling, inspec-
tions and tests by the licensee and subcontractors.
Attention was also paid to radiation protection and
control room activities and house-keeping in gen-
eral. STUK supervised the shutdown of the plant
units and their start-up after the outages. Prior to
the beginning of a new fuel cycle, STUK reviewed
the safety analyses made for each plant unit for
fuel reloading. The loading of fuel assemblies into
the reactor according to plan was also assured.
The nuclear material inventory was ascertained
prior to the closing of the reactor pressure vessel
head.
Inspections, as required in Guide YVL 3.0, were
carried out by STUK or by an inspection organisa-
tion approved by STUK during the annual main-
tenance outages. In addition, periodic inspections
of pressure equipment and other pressure-bearing
components were monitored by reviewing pro-
grammes pertaining to them and by witnessing
inspections onsite.
The outages are described in more detail in
Appendix 5.
Event investigation
Two event investigation teams were set up at
STUK in 2002. STUK appoints a team to investi-
gate a plant event especially when the licensee’s
organisation has not operated as planned or when
an event is assessed to lead to significant modifi-
cations in the plant or its procedures. A STUK
investigation team is also set up if the licensee has
not investigated an event’s root causes well
enough.
The licensees assess their plant events, taking
action, if necessary. STUK assesses these licensee
measures as part of regulatory control. STUK
assesses also its own activities in connection with
plant events.
Event investigations under way in 2002 are
described in sub-sections 4.2.3 and 4.3.3.
Personnel competence
STUK assessed the appropriateness and adequacy
of organisations available for use by the licensees
as well as their personnel training programmes.
On request of the licensees STUK authorised new
responsible managers, as referred to in the Nucle-
ar Energy Decree, for the nuclear power plants,
the research reactor and one small-scale user of
nuclear materials. On licensee requests, their per-
sonnel were authorised to work as shift managers
or operators at a nuclear power plant and as oper-
ators at the research reactor. These were mainly
individual authorisations for a new 3-year period,
granted to 26 persons at Loviisa facility and 33
persons at Olkiluoto facility. Five operators were
authorised to work with the research reactor.
On the request of Fortum Power and Heat Oy
and Teollisuuden Voima Oy, STUK authorised also
testing organisations and their employees to in-
spect and test mechanical equipment in nuclear
power plants. On the request of Fortum Power and
Heat Oy, the applicant’s employees were author-
ised to conduct commissioning inspections after
the repair and modification of electrical and in-
strumentation components at Loviisa nuclear pow-
er plant. In addition, on the request of both licen-
sees, STUK authorised their inspection organisa-
tions to conduct inspections of mechanical equip-
ment and structures.
Nuclear liability
The Nuclear Energy Act prescribes STUK’s re-
sponsibility to ascertain that the liability for dam-
ages of a nuclear facility’s owner in case of nuclear
damage has been arranged as stipulated. The In-
surance Supervisory Authority reviews the con-
tents of liability arrangements. The regulatory
procedure is described in detail in Guide YVL 1.16,
16
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Control of nuclear liability insurance policies. The
licensees submitted to STUK the necessary docu-
ments as described in the guide. STUK has estab-
lished that the liability arrangements were as pre-
scribed in legislation.
4.2 Loviisa power plant
4.2.1 Operation and operational events
Both units of Loviisa nuclear power plant operat-
ed reliably. The load factor of Loviisa 1 was 89.3%
and that of Loviisa 2 was 82.2%. The duration of
the annual maintenance outages was 28 days at
Loviisa 1 and 50 days at Loviisa 2. The course of
the outages and the actions taken are described in
Appendix 5. In addition to the annual mainte-
nance outage, there were two brief breaks in elec-
tricity generation at Loviisa 2. The plant unit’s
turbines tripped in August in consequence of a
fault in a card for control electronics of the plant
protection system, which caused a few hours’
break in production. In March the plant unit was
brought to shutdown state for about five days to
repair a valve in the pressuriser spray line. These
were the only production breaks at the plant units.
In the second quarter of 2002, both Loviisa plant
units were operating in lowered power mode for a
few days due to Finland’s energy situation.
Production losses due to component failures
were 0.7% at Loviisa 1 and 1.3% at Loviisa 2.
Figure 8 gives the daily average gross powers
of the plant units in 2002. Load factors and the
number of reactor scrams in 1993–2002 are given
in Figures 9 and 10.
The Loviisa plant units reported ten operating
events to STUK. The number of event reports in
1993–2002 is given in Fig. 11. Event-specific re-
ports are special reports, which in 2002 were
provided for events mentioned in sub-section 4.2.2,
as well as transient reports and scram reports. In
addition to event-based reports, Loviisa power
plant submitted to STUK the following reports:
daily reports, quarterly reports, annual reports,
outage reports, annual environmental radiation
safety reports, monthly individual dose reports,
annual operational event feedback reports and
safeguards reports.
One event at the Loviisa plant units was classi-
fied INES Level 1. During the annual mainte-
nance outage, the boric acid concentration of the
Loviisa 1 primary circuit went below the limit of
the Technical Specifications. Other events had no
Figure 8. Daily average gross power of the Loviisa plant units in 2002.
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bearing on radiation and nuclear safety. Appendix
6 gives the most significant events at the plant
units in 2002. The numbers of INES Level 1 and
above events in 1993–2002 are given in Fig. 12.
The effect of component unavailability on acci-
dent risk at the Loviisa plant units is dealt with in
Appendix 7. STUK did not require specific meas-
ures from the licensee due to the unavailabilities.
The causes of the events at Loviisa nuclear
power plant, divided into technical and non-tech-
nical, i.e. human or organisational, are presented
in Fig. 13. The number of human-based events has
been decreasing after 2000.
4.2.2 Non-compliance with the
Technical Specifications
The three below events at the Loviisa plant units
were in non-compliance with the Technical Speci-
fications:
• Preventive maintenance work not in compli-
ance with the Technical Specifications
• Two isolation valves were not tested at Loviisa
1 in 2001 (the situation was detected in 2002)
• The primary circuit boric acid concentration at
Loviisa 1 went below the limit of the Technical
Specifications
Detailed descriptions of the events are given in
Appendix 6.
Figure 9. Load factors of the Loviisa plant units.
Figure 10. Number of reactor scrams at the Loviisa
units, scram tests excluded (reactor power exceeds
5%).
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Figure 11. Number of event-specific reports from Loviisa
plant.
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Figure 12. INES Level 1 and above events at Loviisa
nuclear power plant.
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Figure 13. The causes of events at Loviisa nuclear
power plant.
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The number of non-compliances with the Tech-
nical Specifications at the plant units has re-
mained unchanged compared with the previous
year, and has decreased in comparison to the turn
of the millennium. It has not given cause to any
special regulatory measures. The licensee has
planned and partly implemented measures to pre-
vent recurrence. The number of non-compliances
with the Technical Specifications in 1993–2002 are
given in Fig. 14.
In addition, the licensee applied in advance for
STUK’s approval for an exemption from the Tech-
nical Specifications. In 2002 the licensee applied
for exemption for 13 situations deviating from the
Technical Specifications. STUK granted all ap-
plied exemptions as such. Nine of the exemptions
dealt with deviations from the Technical Specifica-
tions due to modifications, repairs and mainte-
nance work. Two exemptions were granted for
deviations due to testing. One exemption author-
ised the postponement of a testing date and one
the skipping of a modification, which was due to
belated deliveries. The yearly number of exemp-
tions in 1993–2002 is given in Fig. 15.
4.2.3 Event investigation
Non-compliances in the approval
procedures of a non-destructive testing
company at Loviisa power plant
An investigation team was set up in STUK in Oc-
tober to look into licensee procedures to assure the
appropriate preparation and granting of requests
submitted to STUK for the approval of organisa-
tions conducting non-destructive testing and mon-
itoring of the validity of the approvals. Included in
the investigation are Loviisa power plant’s negli-
gences in adhering to time limits given in STUK’s
decisions as regards requests for additional infor-
mation on the qualification of inspection systems.
The team’s further task was also to find out about
the view of Fortum Power and Heat Oy on the
handling of the qualification procedure for inspec-
tion systems and the resources required by it. The
investigation extended to 2003.
In accordance with section 113 of the Nuclear
Energy Decree (161/1988), non-destructive testing
of a nuclear power plant’s structures and compo-
nents may only be carried out by a testing compa-
ny or a tester approved by the Radiation and
Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK). The licensee
has to submit an application in writing for approv-
al of the testing company or tester mentioned in
subsection one for their duties.
A STUK-inspector had noticed at the beginning
of the 2002 annual maintenance outages of the
Loviisa plant units, towards the end of July, that
STUK’s authorisation of one testing company to
conduct inspections at both plant units had ex-
pired. The inspector orally notified the plant’s
representative of the matter. Loviisa power plant
did not apply for renewal of the approval in
question after the starting of the annual mainte-
nance, or during it, but during the annual mainte-
nance of Loviisa 2, after a reminder had been sent.
While processing the application for authorisa-
tion of the testing company in question, STUK
noticed that the company had carried out inspec-
tions at both Loviisa plant units already in 2000
even though the authorisation had expired on 1
August 1999.
Figure 14. Number of non-compliances with the
Technical Specifications at Loviisa plant units.
Figure 15. Number of exemptions from the Technical
Specifications at Loviisa plant units.
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4.2.4 Safety improvements
The safety of Loviisa power plant was further en-
hanced based on new, post-commissioning safety
requirements given in YVL guides, the results of
probabilistic safety analyses and, to some extent,
operating experience.
Several measures to mitigate the consequences
of severe accidents were implemented at Loviisa 2.
The most important of them was assuring reactor
pressure vessel external cooling in a situation
involving a core melt in the bottom of the pressure
vessel in consequence of a severe accident. After
the modifications have been completed the hot
corium melt formed in a severe accident can be
contained inside the reactor pressure vessel.
Modifications have been continued at both
plant units to decrease the risk of leaks exceeding
5 kg/s from the primary circuit to outside the
containment through different systems. In addi-
tion, the risk of leaks below 5 kg/s to outside the
reactor containment through primary and second-
ary systems has been decreased by means of plant
modifications.
Loviisa 1 commissioned 58 new fixed radiation
monitors that replaced the most part of the plant’s
system for monitoring of external radiation, air
activity and process activity. Radiation measure-
ment data is transmitted to the radiation situa-
tion monitoring points onsite more efficiently than
before.
Pump replacements in the low pressure emer-
gency coolant system and also piping modifica-
tions were completed at both plant units. Struc-
tural weaknesses in the old pumps were thus
eliminated and mechanical stresses from piping to
pumps reduced. The new type of pump is more
efficient than the original pump type and is capa-
ble of injecting water against a higher pressure,
which improved the capacity of the low pressure
emergency cooling system as well.
Safety improvements are described in more
detail in Appendix 4.
4.2.5 Probabilistic safety analyses
No additions were made to the probabilistic safety
analysis of Loviisa nuclear power plant in 2002.
4.2.6 Radiation safety
Occupational radiation doses
The radiation doses of those who worked at Lovii-
sa nuclear power plant in 2002 were below the
50 mSv annual limit. The distribution of individu-
al doses in 2002 is given in Table II. The highest
individual dose at Loviisa nuclear power plant was
20.8 mSv. It accumulated during work at Loviisa
and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants. The highest
individual dose incurred at Loviisa nuclear power
plant alone was 19.5 mSv.
Individual radiation doses did not exceed the
dose limit of 100 mSv defined for any period of five
years. The highest individual dose to a Finnish
nuclear power plant worker in the 5-year period
1998–2002, 84.6 mSv, was received at Loviisa nu-
clear power plant.
The collective occupational radiation dose at
Loviisa plant in 2002 was 2.61 manSv. The collec-
tive occupational dose was 1.04 manSv at Loviisa
1 and 1.57 manSv at Loviisa 2. STUK guidelines
state that the threshold for one plant unit’s collec-
tive dose averaged over two successive years is
2.5 manSv per one gigawatt of net electrical pow-
er. This means a radiation dose of 1.22 manSv per
one Loviisa plant unit. This value was not exceed-
ed at either plant unit. The collective occupational
doses incurred at Loviisa and Olkiluoto power
plants in 1993–2002 are given in Fig. 16. The
yearly collective dose is mostly incurred in outage
work. Radiation doses incurred during annual
maintenance outages are described in Appendix 5.
Radioactive releases from Loviisa nuclear pow-
er plant were well below authorised limits in 2002.
Releases of radioactive noble gases were ca. 5 TBq,
i.e. 0.02% of authorised limit. The releases of
radioactive noble gases were dominated by argon-
41, i.e. the activation product of argon-40, origi-
nating in the air space between the reactor pres-
sure vessel and the biological shield. The releases
of radioactive iodine isotopes were ca. 1 MBq, i.e.
ca. 0.0005% of authorised limit. Aerosol releases
were ca. 67 MBq, tritium releases ca. 0.2 TBq and
carbon-14 releases ca. 0.4 TBq into the air. The
tritium content of liquid effluents, 13 TBq, was
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ca. 9% of the release limit. The total activity of
other nuclides released into the sea was 85 MBq,
i.e. ca. 0.01% of the release limit. Information
about noble gas and iodine releases into the air in
1993–2002 are given in Fig. 17 and information
about liquid releases in 1993–2002 can be found in
Fig. 18. The numerical value of the release limit
shows the nuclide-group specific release limit for
the plant site, assuming that other releases would
not occur. The total release limit is calculated such
that the sum of the release limit shares of the
various groups does not exceed 1.
The release limits are designed to maintain
individual annual radiation exposure in the sur-
rounding population from plant operation clearly
below the threshold value of 100 microSv, as
determined by the Government Resolution (395/
1991). The calculated radiation dose of the most
exposed individual in the environment of the facil-
ity was ca. 0.05 microSv, i.e. less than 0.1% of the
set limit. The radiation doses calculated for 1993–
2002 are given in Fig. 19.
Environmental radiation monitoring
Environmental radiation monitoring around a nu-
clear power plant comprises on- and offsite meas-
urements as well as the determination of radioac-
tive substances to establish public exposure and
radioactive substances present in the environ-
ment.
In the environment of Loviisa nuclear power
plant, 310 samples were analysed in accordance
with a monitoring programme. Radioactive sub-
stances originating in Loviisa plant were measur-
able in two samples of deposition, one sample of
bottom fauna, ten samples of aquatic plants and
nine samples of sinking matter. The dominating
power plant-based radioactive substance, cobalt-
60, was measured in all of the aforementioned
samples. The total number of observations was 21.
The next most dominant were the radioactive
isotopes of manganese and silver (silver-110m, 14
observations and manganese-54, 13 observations).
Also tritium was detected in some samples (9
observations) as well as a radioactive isotope of
cobalt (Co-58, 9 observations), antimonium (Sb-
Table II. Occupational radiation dose distribution by
employment relationships at Loviisa and Olkiluoto plant
units in 2002.
 Dose range Number of persons
(mSv) by dose range
Loviisa Olkiluoto total*
< 0,5 210 427 576
0.5–1 118 227 308
1–2 153 209 347
2–3 86 85 165
3–4 50 42 98
4–5 41 16 61
5–6 35 14 49
6–7 30 2 35
7–8 18 0 26
8–9 11 5 25
9–10 14 2 12
10–11 10 1 17
11–12 8 – 15
12–13 9 – 11
13–14 7 – 11
14–15 3 – 5
15–16 7 – 6
16–17 9 – 11
17–18 6 – 5
18–19 2 – 3
19–20 5 – 5
20–21 – – 1
21–25 – – 1
> 25 – – –
* The data in these columns also include Finnish workers who
have received doses at Swedish nuclear power plants. The same
person may have worked at both Finnish nulear power plants
and in Sweden.
Source: STUK’s dose register
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Figure 16. Collective occupational doses at Loviisa
nuclear power plant.
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Figure 17. Radioactive releases into the air from Loviisa nuclear power plant.
Figure 18. Radioactive releases into the sea from Loviisa nuclear power plant.
Figure 19. Individual radiation doses calculated for the
most exposed population group in the environment of
Loviisa nuclear power plant.
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124, 8 observations), zirconium (Zr-95, three obser-
vations) and tellurium (Te-123m, one observa-
tion).
All the detected concentrations were low and
had no bearing of radiation exposure.
Radioactive strontium and caesium isotopes
(strontium-90, caesium-134 and -137) as well as
plutonium isotopes (plutonium-238 and 239, 240)
originating from the Chernobyl accident and the
fallout from nuclear weapons tests are still meas-
urable in environmental samples. Natural radio-
active substances (i.a. beryllium-7, potassium-40
and uranium plus thorium with their decay prod-
ucts) are also detected. Their concentrations usu-
ally exceed those of nuclides originating from the
power plant or fallout.
Dosimeters for external radiation measure-
ment have been placed in about 20 locations in the
vicinity of domestic nuclear power plants, at a
distance of 1–10 kilometres from the plants; and
there are also 25 continuous-operation radiation
dose rate measuring stations at about five kilome-
tres’ distance from the plants. The measurement
data from these stations are transferred to the
power plants’ control rooms and to the national
radiation-monitoring network. Monitoring is com-
plemented by dose rate monitoring measurements
and spectrometric measurements. In the environ-
ment of Loviisa facility, 12 such external radiation
measurements were made.
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4.3 Olkiluoto power plant
4.3.1 Operation and operational events
Both units of Olkiluoto nuclear power plant oper-
ated reliably. The load factor of Olkiluoto 1 was
95.3 % and that of Olkiluoto 2 was 96.6%. The
duration of the annual maintenance outage of
Olkiluoto 1 was 13 days and that of Olkiluoto 2
seven days. The measures taken during the outag-
es are described in Appendix 5.
In consequence of a transient in the national
400 kV transmission grid, a reactor scram oc-
curred at Olkiluoto 1 on 20 April 2002. The event
is described in more detail in Appendix 6. There
was a brief production break at Olkiluoto 2 to
replace valves of low pressure turbines. Sub-sec-
tion 4.3.3 describes the cause of the valve replace-
ments. In addition, electricity generation at
Olkiluoto 2 was discontinued for about a day to
check relief system valves. There were no other
breaks in electricity generation, apart from the
annual maintenance outages.
Production losses from component malfunc-
tions were 0.6% at Olkiluoto 1 and 0.7% at
Olkiluoto 2.
Fig. 20 gives the daily average gross powers of
the plant units in 2002. Load factors and the
number of reactor scrams in 1993–2002 are given
in Figs. 21 and 22.
Olkiluoto plant reported 13 operational events
to STUK. The number of event reports in 1993–
2002 is given in Fig. 23. Event-based reports
include special reports, which in 2002 were provid-
ed for events mentioned in sub-section 4.3.2, as
well as transient reports and scram reports. In
addition to event reports, Olkiluoto power plant
submitted to STUK the following reports: daily
reports, quarterly reports, annual reports, outage
reports, annual environmental radiation safety
reports, monthly individual dose reports, annual
operational event feedback reports and safeguards
reports.
One event at the Olkiluoto plant units was
classified INES Level 1. It occurred at Olkiluoto 1
Figure 20. Daily average gross power of the Olkiluoto plant units in 2002.
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where, in tests following the annual maintenance
outage, it was detected that two safety limits of
the neutron flux measuring system were not oper-
ating as designed. Other plant events had no
bearing on radiation and nuclear safety. Appendix
6 gives the most significant events at the plant
units. The number of INES Level 1 and above
events in 1993–2002 are given in Fig. 24.
The effect of component inoperability on acci-
dent risk at the Olkiluoto plant units is dealt with
in Appendix 7. STUK did not require specific
measures from the licensee due to the inoperabili-
ties.
Figure 25. The causes of events at Olkiluoto nuclear
power plant.
Figure 24. INES Level 1 and above events at Olkiluoto
nuclear power plant.
Figure 23. Number of event-specific reports from
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant.
Figure 22. Number of reactor scrams at the Olkiluoto
units, scram tests excluded (reactor power exceeds
5%).
Figure 21. Load factors of the Olkiluoto plant units.
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The causes of the events at Olkiluoto facility,
divided into technical and non-technical, i.e. hu-
man or organisational, are presented in Fig. 25.
The number of human-induced events has been on
the increase during the last two years.
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4.3.2 Plant events in non-compliance with
the Technical Specifications
The following seven events at the Olkiluoto plant
units were in non-compliance with the Technical
Specifications:
• Diesel fuel oil cloud point limit in storage tank
was exceeded at both plant units
• Moving of plotter displays from the main con-
trol room to the relay room was not in compli-
ance with the Technical Specifications at both
plant units
• Two fuel assemblies were erroneously moved
at Olkiluoto 1
• Partial inoperability of the neutron flux meas-
uring system at both plant units.
Detailed descriptions are given in Appendix 6.
The number of plant events in non-compliance
with the Technical Specifications has clearly in-
creased from 2002. This is essentially due to the
fact that three of last year’s events were caused by
the same reason at both plant units. The quality
management measures intended to prevent the
events had been insufficient. The licensee has
planned, or has already implemented, measures to
prevent recurrence. The number of non-compli-
ances with the Technical Specifications in 1993–
2002 are given in Fig. 26.
The licensee applied in advance for STUK’s
approval for exemptions from the Technical Speci-
fications. In 2002 the licensee applied for exemp-
tion for 11 situations deviating from the Technical
Specifications. STUK granted eight applications
as such. In three cases a decision not to process
the application was made Four of the exemptions
dealt with deviations from the Technical Specifica-
tions due to modifications. Two exemptions were
granted for a deviation due to a situation induced
by a failed component and, similarly, two for an
inspection or testing. The yearly number of ex-
emptions in 1993–2002 is given in Fig. 27.
4.3.3 Event investigation
Degradation of low pressure turbine valves
at Olkiluoto 2 and a temporary turbine
protection system modification
STUK set up an investigation team in January to
look into and assess the licensee’s decision-making
and procedures in the handling of low pressure
turbine valve degradation at Olkiluoto 2 and in
the implementation of a temporary modification to
I&C systems due to worsening valve problems.
The team gave the licensee several recommenda-
tions pertaining to the operation of the organisa-
tion and the flow of information.
The control and shutdown valves of the low
pressure turbine of Olkiluoto 2 failed for the first
time in a functional test of the valves in Septem-
ber 2001. Despite several attempts to close them,
one valve in two steam lines remained partially
open. Functional testing takes place every two
months. Periodic tests indicated the condition of
the valves was deteriorating with time. At the end
of January it was unclear how well steam lines
leading to the low pressure turbine would have
closed. The remaining fully open of two low pres-
sure lines would raise turbine revolutions clearly
above the revs limit recommended by the turbine
plant vendor. It is also obvious that, in case of load
rejection, the turbine control system would not
have been capable of driving the plant to the
house load operation mode.
Assisted by the turbine vendor, the licensee
Figure 26. Number of non-compliances with the
Technical Specifications at Olkiluoto plant units.
Figure 27. Number of exemptions from the Technical
Specifications at Olkiluoto plant units.
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designed a temporary modification to the turbine
protection system, which initiates a turbine trip
when a plant circuit breaker or a generator break-
er opens. In addition, the time-delay to post-
turbine trip vacuum breaking was made shorter.
These modifications are designed to limit turbine
overspeeding and to reduce the risk of its damag-
ing in the situations in question.
On 22 January 2002 the licensee decided to
implement the modifications. This was done on 24
January 2002 with the facility in full power opera-
tion, and plans are to keep them in force until the
2002 annual maintenance. It was discovered later
that the modifications would not have protected
the turbine due to the worsening of the valve
problems. In consequence of the modifications, the
plant unit would not have been capable of chang-
ing over to house-turbine operation in any situa-
tion, i.e. the plant unit would have fallen short of
its original design basis. The licensee thus decided
to replace the defective valves. For this purpose
the plant unit was brought into hot shutdown
state, which lasted for about one day, on 26 Janu-
ary 2002. The turbine’s protection system was
restored to its pre-modification state. The removed
valves were dismantled and their roller bearings
were discovered to have become jammed due to
dried up lubricating grease. The drying was caused
by a new type of grease unsuited for this purpose,
which was used after original grease had become
unavailable.
In an investigation report STUK gave recom-
mendations on the licensee’s organisation, quality
management, safety culture and I&C system mod-
ifications and also required the licensee to report
on them. STUK’s review of the report has not yet
been completed since actions presented by the
licensee on account of STUK’s recommendations
have not been completed.
The recommendations on STUK’s own opera-
tion given in the investigation report focused on
the analysis and registration of safety-significant
faults as well as the clarification of the process of
enacting new YVL guides or those under revision.
During normal regulatory work STUK had
learned about the failure observations made dur-
ing valve testing. However, STUK lacked suffi-
cient information about their significance to be
able to anticipate their safety significance. STUK
learned about the modification to the automation
systems only during the implementation phase
and thus could not give its view on it prior to its
implementation. An action plan has been drawn
up for the implementation of improvements rec-
ommended to STUK’s operation.
4.3.4 Safety improvements
Further improvements in the safety of Olkiluoto
power plant were made, based on new, post-com-
missioning safety requirements established in
YVL guides, results of probabilistic safety analy-
ses and partly on operating experience.
Several measures to mitigate the consequences
of severe accidents were implemented at the
Olkiluoto units. The personnel lock of the Olkiluo-
to 2 containment building was strengthened in
2002. After the modification the containment
building withstands better than before occasional
heavy pressure shocks that might occur in a
severe accident.
The main control room desks of both plant
units were provided with valve-specific selector
switches for changing the operating range of the
reactor core spray system, which is dependent on
the reactor level, to ascertain emergency cooling
in some accident conditions.
The reactor control rod manoeuvring and posi-
tion indication system of Olkiluoto 1 was upgrad-
ed. The upgrading made control of the rods more
accurate, improved their position data and test
reporting, and reduced malfunctions. It also re-
duces the probability of erroneous control rod
withdrawal.
The replacement of ageing rotating direct/al-
ternating current converters with modern UPS
equipment was completed. The converters were
replaced due to increased maintenance costs, low
efficiency and ageing-induced malfunctions.
The oldest computers in the Olkiluoto 1 process
computer system plus their process interface
equipment were upgraded and provided with user
interfaces.
Safety improvements are described in more
detail in Appendix 4.
4.3.5 Probabilistic safety analyses
The review of a weather risk analysis for Olkiluo-
to power plant was completed. It says that the risk
from weather phenomena and sea-water related
phenomena is almost solely due to the loss of sea
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water cooling caused by seaweed, mussels in the
sea water tunnel and frazil ice. The share of
weather phenomena and similar environmental
phenomena of the plant’s total core damage fre-
quency is about 5%.
Very high uncertainties were noted to be relat-
ed to the analysis. These concern the occurrence
frequencies of extreme weather conditions on one
hand and the success probability of counter-meas-
ures on the other. The review underlined the
dependence of Olkiluoto power plant on the avail-
ability of sea water cooling.
Studies commissioned in 2000–2001 by the
Finnish Meteorological Institute and the Finnish
Institute of Marine Research were utilised in
reviewing sections of the analysis pertaining to
actual weather phenomena and sea water levels.
The results of the weather risk analysis do not
give cause for immediate measures at the plant.
Based on the review, however, the licensee was
required to process several additional questions in
the next update of the weather risk analysis.
4.3.6 Radiation safety
Occupational radiation doses
The radiation doses of those who worked at
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant in 2002 were below
the 50 mSv annual limit. The distribution of indi-
vidual doses in 2002 is given in Table II. The high-
est individual dose at Olkiluoto nuclear power
plant was 10.4 mSv. Individual radiation doses in
1998–2002 were also below the 100 mSv dose limit
determined for a 5-year period.
In 2002 the collective occupational dose was
0.81 manSv at Olkiluoto 1 and 0.31 manSv at
Olkiluoto 2; the total for both plant units being
1.12 manSv. STUK guidelines state that the
threshold for one plant unit’s collective dose aver-
aged over two successive years is 2.10 manSv. This
value was not exceeded in either plant unit. The
collective occupational doses incurred at Olkiluoto
power plant in 1993–2002 are given in Fig. 28. The
radiation doses incurred during annual mainte-
nance outages are described in Appendix 5.
Radioactive releases
Radioactive releases into the environment from
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant in 2002 were well
below authorised limits. The releases of noble gas-
es into the air were ca. 0.03 TBq, i.e. 0.0002% of
authorised limits. The releases of iodine into the
air were ca. 10 MBq, i.e. ca. 0.009% of authorised
limit. Aerosol releases into the air were ca. 30
MBq, tritium releases into the air ca. 0.4 TBq and
carbon-14 releases into the air ca. 1 TBq. The tri-
tium content of liquid effluents to the sea, 1 TBq,
was ca. 6% of the annual release limit. The total
activity of other nuclides released into the sea was
0.8 GBq, i.e. ca. 0.3% of the plant-site specific re-
lease limit. Information about noble gas and io-
dine releases into the air in 1993–2002 are given
in Fig. 29 and information about liquid releases in
1993–2002 can be found in Fig. 30. The numerical
value shows the nuclide-group specific release lim-
it for the plant site assuming that other releases
would not occur. The total release limit is calculat-
ed such that the sum of the release limit shares of
the various groups does not exceed 1.
The calculated radiation dose of the most ex-
posed individual in the environment of the
Olkiluoto plant was ca. 0.07 microSv, i.e. less than
0.1% of the limit prescribed by the Government.
The radiation doses calculated for 1993–2002 are
given in Fig. 31.
Environmental radiation monitoring
In the environment of Olkiluoto nuclear power
plant, 294 samples were analysed in accordance
with a monitoring programme. Radioactive sub-
stances originating in Olkiluoto nuclear power
plant were measured in one sample of air, one
sample of deposition, one sample of fish, two sam-
ples of bottom fauna, 15 samples of aquatic plants
and 14 samples of sinking matter. The dominating
power plant-based radioactive substance, cobalt-
Figure 28. Collective occupational doses at Olkiluoto
nuclear power plant.
0
1
2
3
93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02
manSv
S T U K - B - Y TO 2 2 4
27
Noble gas releases (as Krypton-87 equivalents) Iodine (as Iodine-131 equivalents). Iodine releases into the air
in 2001 were below the detection limit.
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Figure 30. Radioactive releases into the sea from Olkiluoto nuclear power plants.
Figure 29. Radioactive releases into the air from Olkiluoto nuclear power plants.
Figure 31. Individual radiation doses calculated for the
most exposed population group in the environment of
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant.
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60, was measured in all of the aforementioned
samples. The total number of observations was 34.
Apart from cobalt, the radioactive isotopes of man-
ganese (manganese-54) were detected in one sam-
ple of deposition and in two samples of aquatic
plants. In addition, elevated tritium concentra-
tions were measured in two samples of deposition
and in one sample of sea water.
All the detected concentrations were low and
had no bearing on radiation exposure.
In addition to the above, 12 external verifica-
tion measurements were made in the environment
of Olkiluoto nuclear power plant.
4.4 Fifth reactor in planning
The preliminary safety assessment on the new nu-
clear power plant by STUK of February 2001 was
complemented in January 2002 as regards exter-
nal threats, such as aircraft impact. The supple-
ment was added because of the terrorist attack on
New York’s WTC on September 11. The supple-
ment states that it is technically possible to build
the new nuclear power plant such that it with-
stands an aircraft impact. Contained in the sup-
plement are general safety requirements for im-
pact resistance and also some other safety require-
ments to provide more extensively than before for
an external attack.
The Government on 17 January 2002 made a
decision-in-principle in favour of the construction
of a fifth reactor and appended to the decision a
statement according to which it calls for adher-
ence to strict safety requirements in the construc-
tion of the new nuclear power plant. The decision-
in-principle was thereafter submitted to the Par-
liament. It’s preparation was lead by the Parlia-
mentary Economic Committee, which requested
statements from seven other committees. STUK’s
experts and management spoke both at commit-
tees and to the media. In the final reading of the
matter in the Parliament on 24 May 2002 votes
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were cast 107–92 in favour of the decision-in-
principle, which remained in force.
STUK began preparing for the regulatory con-
trol of the new plant project after the making of
the Parliamentary decision. The schedule for pre-
paratory work is based on a plan of Teollisuuden
Voima Oy in which the processing of the construc-
tion permit application for the new plant takes
place in 2004 and the plant’s completion at the
end of the current decade.
In 2002 STUK prepared a preliminary regula-
tory project plan, set up a regulatory co-ordination
project group and prepared the first regulatory
working load assessments for the plant project.
The need to revise STUK’s YVL guides was as-
sessed and re-prioritisation was applied. Since
safety and risk are of vital importance when
defining quality criteria and in focusing regulato-
ry control, STUK’s views on the safety classifica-
tion of systems and components as well as on their
diversity principles were further defined.
STUK’s competence and resources, which are
required in the processing of the construction
permit application, were mapped. On this basis,
the initial phase of recruiting new experts was
started, which relates to the new plant project
first of all but also to other significant projects,
such as modifications planned to the I&C systems
of the operating plant unties.
4.5 FiR 1 research reactor
STUK regulates electricity-generating nuclear
power plants as well as the FiR 1 research reactor
operated by the Technical Research Centre of Fin-
land (VTT). The reactor is located in Otaniemi,
Espoo, and its maximum thermal power is 250 kW.
The reactor is used for fabrication of radioactive
tracers, activation analysis, student training and
treatment of brain tumours by neutron irradiation
(Boron Neutron Capture Therapy - BNCT) as well
as development of BNCT therapy.
STUK’s periodic inspections focused on the
reactor’s quality management, operation, radia-
tion protection, radioactive releases, fire protec-
tion, emergency preparedness and physical pro-
tection, and safeguards. No significant safety prob-
lems were observed in the reactor’s operation in
2002. Occupational radiation doses and radioac-
tive releases into the environment in 2002 were
clearly below set limits.
VTT’s organisation changed on 1 January 2002
when VTT Energy and VTT Chemical Technology
formed a new research unit called VTT Processes.
The FiR 1 reactor was made directly subordinate
to the field manager of VTT Processes. On the
request of VTT Processes, STUK in July 2002
authorised FiR 1’s new responsible manager and
in December five reactor operators.
4.6 Other nuclear facilities
The regulatory control of nuclear facilities per-
taining to nuclear waste management, such as
storage space, is dealt with in Chapter 5.
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5.1 Spent nuclear fuel
STUK monitored the storage of spent nuclear fuel
by regular inspections and by reviewing plans and
witnessing work pertaining to storage equipment.
No storage-related events occurred that would
have endangered safety. The yearly volumes of
spent fuel stored onsite are given in Figure 32.
Posiva Oy, a company owned by Teollisuuden
Voima Oy and Fortum Power and Heat Oy, carries
out R&D and planning into spent fuel disposal
and prepares for its implementation at a later
date. On the company’s application the Govern-
ment has made a decision-in-principle on the
construction of a final disposal facility in Olkiluo-
to. Posiva is in the process of implementing an
extensive R&D and planning project to ascertain
suitability of the repository site and to obtain the
research data needed to assure the safety of final
disposal. The research programme includes,
among others, the construction of an underground
research facility in Olkiluoto as of 2004. The
facility may be later used as part of the final
repository proper, a fact which needs to be consid-
ered in the regulation of the research facility’s
implementation.
Posiva Oy continued to carry out geological
research programmes to determine the baseline of
the local bedrock and to support the design of the
underground research facility. STUK has set up
four follow-up teams to monitor these pieces of
research, which also include independent experts
from Finland and abroad. In 2002 the follow-up
teams assessed in particular the bedrock structur-
al model, the research facility access route de-
signs, geohydrological studies and modelling as
well as GPS measurements of rock movements.
5 Nuclear waste management regulation
Figure 32. The volumes of spent nuclear fuel at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plant sites.
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Figure 33. The volumes of reactor waste at the Loviisa and Olkiluoto plant sites.
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Posiva continued technical R&D into nuclear
fuel encapsulation and final disposal as well as
safety research, most of it in co-operation with the
Swedish nuclear waste company SKB. The compa-
ny submitted reports on three alternative techni-
cal designs for an encapsulation facility; STUK
assessed the designs from the safety point of view
and informed Posiva about its views.
5.2 Reactor waste
The utilities in 2002 followed earlier practices in
carrying out their medium and low-level waste
maintenance activities. A solidification facility is
Loviisa power plant’s most important nuclear
waste project, the Preliminary Safety Analysis Re-
port of which STUK approved in March 2001. The
facility’s construction was postponed, however, and
is due to start in 2003 according to current plans,
in which case it would be completed by the end of
2006.
STUK inspected the handling and storage of
reactor waste at both plant sites. The inspections
dealt with, among others, the definition of the
radionuclide inventory of waste drums and waste
accounting as well as the concrete and rock struc-
tures of the disposal facilities for reactor waste.
No safety-related problems occurred in the
treatment, storage and final disposal of reactor
waste. Yearly waste volumes are given in Figure
33.
5.3 Other regulatory activities
STUK gave to the Ministry of Trade and Industry
a statement, as referred to in section 78 of the
Nuclear Energy Decree, about the licensees’ nucle-
ar waste management measures and plans. The
statement assesses how, in preparing for nuclear
waste management, the licensees have proceeded
in relation to the goals set out by the Government.
STUK also gave statements, as referred to in sec-
tion 90 of the Nuclear Energy Decree, about mak-
ing financial provision for the costs of nuclear
waste management, which assess the technical
plans based on which financial provision is made.
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6.1 Safeguards at Finnish
nuclear facilities
As regards nuclear power plants, STUK’s safe-
guards focused on the import, transport, storage
and domestic transfer of nuclear fuel, and refuel-
ling. The licensees submit to STUK the necessary
annual plans, advance notifications and reports in
compliance with safeguards requirements.
STUK granted Teollisuuden Voima Oy four
licences for the import of fresh nuclear fuel. In
addition, Teollisuuden Voima Oy was granted two
other licences for the import and one licence for
the import/export of nuclear material. Fortum
Power and Heat Oy was granted two licences for
the import of nuclear material. VTT Processes was
granted a licence for the import from England of
uranium oxide pellets of enriched uranium and
also a licence for the export to and re-import from
the USA of control rod drive mechanisms for use
as spare parts. A list of the licences granted can be
found in Appendix 2.
A total of nine inspections were made at Lovii-
sa power plant and 17 inspections at Olkiluoto
power plant in 2002. Euratom and the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency IAEA participated in
23 of these inspections.
In addition to the domestic nuclear power
plants, minor amounts of nuclear material can be
found at other facilities. The most significant of
these is FiR 1, the research reactor operated by
the VTT where one inspection was conducted in
2002. STUK, the IAEA and Euratom participated
in the inspection. Regulatory control also covers
the Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the Depart-
ment of Chemistry of the University of Helsinki,
OMG Kokkola Chemicals and STUK.
Nuclear material safeguards employ several
methods to verify that data on nuclear materials
reported by the operator, such as burn-out and
cooling time, are correct and complete. Other nu-
clear-safety related data, from operational safety
to final disposal, can be verified also by measure-
ments. In 2002 STUK verified by non-destructive
methods at Olkiluoto and Loviisa power plants 94
and 10 spent fuel assemblies respectively.
Every material balance area operated in com-
pliance with STUK-approved manuals and in a
way facilitating STUK’s fulfilling of the obliga-
tions of international agreements signed by Fin-
land.
In 2002 STUK authorised 16 Euratom and 11
IAEA inspectors to make inspections at Finnish
nuclear facilities.
6.2 Overall safeguards renewal
International safeguards were implemented by
the IAEA and the Euratom Safeguards office of
the EU. IAEA safeguards are based on the Non-
Proliferation Treaty and the Safeguards Agree-
ment (INFCIRC/193) signed by virtue of the Trea-
ty by non-nuclear EU member states, Euratom
and the IAEA. Euratom safeguards are based on
the Euratom Treaty and Commission Regulation
3227/76 given by virtue of the Treaty.
In connection with safeguards activities based
on the Model Protocol Additional (INFCIRC/540),
which deals with the strengthening of the IAEA
safeguards system, STUK participated in informa-
tion exchange and consultation meetings arranged
by the IAEA and Euratom. The field testing of
safeguards implementation in accordance with the
Protocol at VTT Chemical Technology was com-
pleted for Finland’s part. The IAEA on 11 of
October 2002 carried out a field-test-related com-
6 Safeguards
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plementary access to VTT. By virtue of the Proto-
col, the IAEA is entitled to complementary access
onsite at 24 hrs’ notice. The test showed that the
connections between the IAEA and STUK are
operational: without delay STUK received inspec-
tion data via the emergency preparedness system
and was able, for its own part, to contribute to the
progress of the inspection. Euratom received an
inspection notice from the IAEA but was unable to
participate in the complementary access. In addi-
tion, STUK has contributed, on the request of
Sweden’s SKI, to discussions and meetings per-
taining to the definition of the concept of site area.
The final disposal of nuclear fuel in under-
ground facilities places new challenges on safe-
guards implementation since encapsulation makes
nuclear material verification impossible in prac-
tice. STUK started preparatory work for the es-
tablishment of national requirements for an en-
capsulation and final disposal facility. The aim is
to create regulatory criteria to cover the needs of
both national and international regulatory organi-
sations.
6.3 Control of radioactive materials
transport
About 20 000 radioactive packages are transport-
ed in Finland every year. STUK is not aware of
any transport accidents involving radioactive ma-
terials, or of any other safety hazards. The most
important forms of nuclear material transport
were imports of fresh nuclear fuel from Germany,
Sweden and Russia. STUK approved the relevant
plans and two types of package for use in Finland.
Of the consignments of nuclear material trans-
ported in 2002, one batch was picked up for de-
tailed inspection.
The importation of radioactive and nuclear
materials is subject to licence, too. In 2001 and
2002 no shipments containing radioactive materi-
al were turned back at the border. The highest
number, 23 consignments, was turned back in
1997. The number is smaller now than in previous
years, partly because consignors and consignees
have, through training and experience, come to
understand the possibility of radioactivity in con-
signments of scrap metal. Control at the borders
has been enhanced and, at the same time, consign-
ments of scrap metal to Finland have decreased.
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STUK-financed safety research focuses on two ar-
eas: development of safety assessment methods
and expertise as well as research in direct support
of regulatory decisions. The former benefits first of
all from the national nuclear power plant safety
and waste research programmes FINNUS and
KYT. Excluded from these programmes is research
commissioned by STUK pertaining to STUK’s own
decisions, which must be independent of similar
research by licensees or licence-applicants. In ad-
dition to these two main areas, STUK also com-
missions independent research that serves to de-
velop regulatory control.
STUK’s experts controlled and monitored the
FINNUS and KYT research programmes and con-
tributed to the planning of the SAFIR programme
that is continuation for the FINNUS programme.
The framework of SAFIR is based on the safety
challenges to nuclear power plants identified for
the current decade, of which there are several
owing to the ageing of operating facilities and to
the fifth reactor in planning.
The general research topics of the FINNUS
programme, which ended in 2002, were nuclear
power plant ageing, reactor accidents and various
risks. The programme was arranged into eleven
research projects whose results are available at
www.vtt.fi/pro/pro1/indexe.htm. Information about
the new SAFIR programme can be found at
www.vtt.fi/pro/tutkimus/safir.
One of the most important tasks of the national
programmes is to follow international co-opera-
tion projects. In the field of reactor safety, STUK
contributed to several projects within the OECD/
NEA and also worked with the US NRC. Of
STUK-commissioned research projects outside the
FINNUS programme, the most significant in 2002
pertained to fire safety and threats external to
nuclear power plants.
The focus of the KYT programme in 2002 was
similar to that of the earlier JYT2001 programme,
i.e. earth sciences, technical barriers, migration of
radioactive substances, safety analyses and tech-
nical solutions. Information on the programme
can be found at www.vtt.fi/pro/tutkimus/kyt (in
Finnish).
In 2002 STUK commissioned nuclear power
plant safety and waste management research to
the following external organisations: VTT Indus-
trial Systems, VTT Processes, VTT Building and
Transport, VTT Information Service, the Geologi-
cal Survey of Finland , the Finnish Institute of
Marine Research, Helsinki University of Technolo-
gy (HUT), Department of Mathematics/Mechanics
of Materials, HUT Material Science and Rock
Engineering, HUT Surveying, Helsinki University
Laboratory of Radiochemistry, Helsinki University
Department of Seismology, Uppsala University,
Enterpris Ltd (England), Enviros consulting Ltd
(Scotland), Geosigma Ab (Sweden), Royal School of
Mines, Imperial College (England), NEMKO Prod-
uct Services Oy and Serco Assurance (formerly
AEA Technology plc) Inspection Validation Centre
(IVC).
Appendix 8 lists STUK-financed safety re-
search completed in 2002. The cost of nuclear
safety research in 1998–2002 is given in Fig. 34.
Current nuclear safety research and publica-
tions are reported in STUK’s web pages at
www.stuk.fi/tutkimustoiminta in Finnish. Re-
search publications can be found at www.stuk.fi/
english/publications/.
7 Safety research
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Figure 34. The cost of nuclear safety research.
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8 Emergency response
STUK arranged several training events and exer-
cises to test and develop its own emergency re-
sponse. In addition, STUK controls the prepared-
ness of the operating organisations of nuclear pow-
er plants to act in unusual situations. No such
situations occurred in 2002.
Emergency response at nuclear power plants is
under continuous development during plant oper-
ation and regularly tested in emergency exercises
as part of emergency preparedness training.
STUK has approved the emergency plans of Lovii-
sa and Olkiluoto nuclear power plants and annu-
ally reviews the implementation of the emergency
preparedness regime, including training and emer-
gency exercises.
Two emergency exercises involving domestic
nuclear power plants were arranged in Finland in
2002 into which STUK participated. Several do-
mestic authorities from local government, regional
administration and central government partici-
pated in an emergency exercise at Olkiluoto nucle-
ar power plant on 15 October 2002. The exercise
tested inter-authority co-operation, the forming an
overall picture of the accident situation and the
dissemination of information to the public and the
media. In addition, Nordic radiation and nuclear
safety authorities followed how STUK communi-
cated an overall picture of the accident situation.
An emergency exercise at Loviisa nuclear power
plant was held on 22 November 2002 and STUK
participated in it in accordance with the plant’s
emergency plan. Essential for STUK in the exer-
cise was the setting up in practice of the emergen-
cy organisation and the launching of its operation
since those taking part in the exercise were not
assigned in advance and were not told its date. A
fire drill was held at Loviisa plant on 29 May 2002
and on 4 December 2002. The fire drill of Olkiluoto
plant was arranged on 25 November 2002.
STUK also participated in nuclear power plant
emergency exercises of international scale, which
in 2002 contained no actual analysis of plant
situations. The main topic of an emergency exer-
cise at the Russian Bilibino on 21 August 2002 was
international information exchange in an acci-
dent. A series of four emergency exercises under
EU financing, on 27 February and 28 May 2002,
tested were the support systems to decision-mak-
ing employed during a nuclear power plant acci-
dent for assessment of the accident’s ill effects in
the plant environment and also the benefits of
protective measures.
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9 Communications
STUK took the initiative in communicating to the
general public matters relating to nuclear safety
regulation and also responded to media questions.
STUK issued bulletins or press releases on 13 top-
ics. The material was published on the Teletex pag-
es of YLE (the Finnish Broadcasting Company)
and on STUK’s web site. In addition, the matters
were discussed in the quarterly STUK-publication
ALARA. The media and liaison groups were pro-
vided with quarterly reports on nuclear safety in
Finland and in the neighbouring countries.
As regards events at Finnish nuclear power
plans, STUK informed the media when the prima-
ry circuit boric acid concentration of Loviisa 1
went below set limit during the annual mainte-
nance outage. It also reported an accident at work
that occurred during the outage. In addition to
reporting events at the plants, STUK issued bulle-
tins on the annual maintenance outages of the
Loviisa and Olkiluoto plant units as well as on
three other breaks in power generation. A bulletin
was put out on the supplementing of the prelimi-
nary safety analysis report for the fifth reactor in
planning.
Information was published about issues relat-
ing to international co-operation as follows: the
meeting to assess the International Nuclear Safe-
ty Convention, a STUK director’s appointment as
chairman of the IAEA’s committee on safety regu-
lation, and training on the monitoring of the
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty given to experts in STUK.
In addition, a bulletin was issued on the develop-
ment of a potential method for detecting unde-
clared nuclear activity.
The bulletins issued by STUK are available to
read on STUK’s Internet site (in Finnish and in
Swedish).
On STUK’s web site, under Reader’s Link,
citizens made questions to STUK’s experts. In
2002, 250 questions were made 6% of which were
about the use of nuclear energy.
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10 International co-operation
Co-operation with the IAEA
The IAEA continued revision of its nuclear safety
guidelines (formerly Nuclear Safety Series NUSS
Guides). The revision is almost done and is expect-
ed to be completed in the coming years. STUK
prepared for the IAEA several statements on draft
guidelines requested from Finland. It also contrib-
uted to the work of teams preparing the draft
guidelines. A representative of STUK was invited
as chairman of the NUSSC (nuclear safety) com-
mittee. In addition, STUK-representatives were
active in the WASSC (waste safety) and RASSC
(radiation safety) committees.
The International Nuclear Safety Convention
requires the submission, every three years, of a
report on how the Convention’s obligations have
been met. The second review meeting was in 2002.
Finland’s report was prepared under STUK’s su-
pervision. The review meeting was held in spring
2002 and Finland’s representation included repre-
sentatives from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
STUK, Teollisuuden Voima Oy and Fortum Power
and Heat Oy. The task of STUK’s representative at
the meeting was to report on it. Finland’s report
was positively received. No remarks were made on
it that would require reporting by Finland in the
next review meeting in 2005.
STUK was Finland’s liaison organisation for
the below information exchange systems for nucle-
ar facilities maintained by the IAEA:
• Incident Reporting System (IRS)
• Incident Reporting System for Research Reac-
tors (IRSRR)
• International Nuclear Event Scale (INES)
• Power Reactor Information System (PRIS).
No events reportable to the IRS, INES and IRSRR
systems occurred in Finland in 2002. Yearly infor-
mation was submitted to the PRIS system on the
operation of Finland’s nuclear power plants.
Funded from the IAEA’s safeguards support
programme, a STUK-representative worked as a
co-ordinator to East and Middle European assist-
ance programmes. The programme is financed by
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and executed by
STUK. Its objectives include development of the
IAEA’s safeguards procedures, training of inspec-
tors and provision of expert assistance
In IAEA expert capacity, a STUK representa-
tive participated in the IRRT assessment of the
Slovakian nuclear safety authority. STUK-experts
lectured in France and Germany on IAEA-courses
on nuclear safety and regulation conducive to the
proficiency of the representatives of East Europe-
an regulatory authorities. STUK’s experts had
participated in the planning of these courses as
well. STUK-experts lectured also at an IAEA
course on radiation protection in waste manage-
ment in the Republic of Moldova; at a course on
communication and transparency in the field of
nuclear safety in Slovenia; and at a course in
Poland on the provision of notification of the
Central European nuclear power situation.
Co-operation with the OECD/NEA
International co-operation in nuclear safety re-
search was mostly channelled through the OECD/
NEA. The organisation also facilitated an ex-
change of opinions about current nuclear safety
questions. STUK was represented in all of the or-
ganisation’s main committees dealing with radia-
tion and nuclear safety. The main committees are
as follows:
• Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installa-
tions (CSNI),
• Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities
(CNRA),
• Committee on Radiation Protection and Public
Health (CRPPH), and
• Radioactive Waste Management Committee
(RWMC).
38
S T U K - B - Y TO 2 2 4
STUK’s Director General acted as chairman of
the CNRA. In addition, STUK took part in the
work of the Working Group on Inspection Practic-
es (WGIP), the Working Group on Public Commu-
nication (WGPG) and the below six CSNI working
groups:
• Working Group on Operating Experience
(WGOE)
• Working Group on Integrity of Components
and Structures (IAGE)
• Working Group on Accident and Analysis
(GAMA)
• Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRISK)
• Special Expert Group on Human and Organi-
sational Factors (SEGHOF)
• Special Expert Group on Fuel Safety Margins
(SEGFSM).
A representative of STUK was chairman of the
CRPPH working group EGRO (Expert Group on
Effluent Release Options).
Co-operation with the EU
STUK participated in the work of the ad hoc Work-
ing Party on Nuclear Safety (WPNS), set up by the
Atomic Questions Group (AQG) subordinate to the
Council of the European Union, assessing the sta-
tus of nuclear safety in EU applicant countries.
The working party first assembled in the spring
2001. The assessment for 2001 contained for each
applicant country recommendations whose imple-
mentation status was assessed in the spring 2002.
The evaluation considered nuclear safety in Slova-
kia, Slovenia, Hungary and the Czech Republic
and to be on a par with that of the EU. Lithuania
would have room for development in the imple-
mentation of some important safety improve-
ments. Bulgaria and Romania have room for im-
provement as well.
STUK contributed to the work of the advisory
Expert Group A31 of the Commission of the Euro-
pean Union. It’s main duties pertain to radiation
protection. In December 2002 it issued a state-
ment on a draft nuclear safety directive proposed
by the Commission (“Nuclear Package”).
STUK contributed to the work of the NRWG
Task Force on Non-Destructive Testing Qualifica-
tion Programmes. The task force has been as-
signed to exchanging experiences on the imple-
mentation and development of qualification in
various European countries and to following and
assessing the qualification of inspections from a
regulatory point of view. The group made a survey
among its members and the EU applicant coun-
tries to exchange experiences.
In addition, STUK participated in the work of
the NRWG Safety Critical Software working group
assigned to collecting common EU regulatory
views on safety-critical software requirements.
In the field of nuclear material safeguards,
STUK participated in the operation of the Europe-
an Safeguards R&D Association (ESARDA).
ESARDA’s duty is to promote and harmonise Eu-
ropean R&D relating to nuclear material control.
ESARDA offers a forum for information and ideas
exchange to authorities, researchers and nuclear
power plant operators.
Via the activities of the Regulatory Assistance
Management Group (RAM-G) of the EU, STUK
participated in Phare/Tacis co-operation in sup-
port of East European regulatory organisations
and their support organisations. STUK’s Director
General was RAM-G Chairman and a STUK-
representative a member. The group assessed the
appropriateness of projects prepared by the EU to
support regulatory work. In addition, STUK con-
tributed to the then-ongoing Tacis projects. STUK
also participated in the work of the CONCERT
working group consisting of the heads of nuclear
safety authorities of the EU member states and
applicant countries. The group assembled twice to
discuss EU-related questions touching on regula-
tory work.
NKS co-operation
The new programme of NKS, Nordic co-operation
in nuclear safety, was launched in 2002. It is di-
rected by two responsible programme managers
instead of the former seven project managers.
STUK heads the new programme’s sub-area per-
taining to reactor safety and also participates in
the planning of the emergency preparedness and
environmental safety programme. In addition,
STUK has a representative in the NKS steering
group.
In the new programme, work is not planned for
more than four years ahead. This change facilitat-
ed in principle the launching of research work in
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good time in the first programme year, and its
success in practice. The on-going projects relating
to reactor safety relate well to Finland’s national
research programme and needs. Several experts
from STUK work with the emergency prepared-
ness and environmental safety programme that
includes focus areas important to Finland.
The new programme’s content in its entirety
serves well co-operation between the Nordic au-
thorities, which is a permanent objective of NKS
co-operation.
Bilateral co-operation
A representative from STUK was an invited mem-
ber of the Reactor Safety Committee assisting the
Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI). A rep-
resentative of SKI was an invited expert in the
Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety that func-
tions in conjunction with STUK. Co-operation with
SKI was continued with regular meetings during
which current questions of nuclear safety regula-
tion were discussed. Information exchange with
the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSI) was
continued as regards doses to Finns who had
worked at nuclear power plants in Sweden and to
Swedes who had worked at Finnish plants.
A representative of STUK was chairman of a
nuclear safety committee that supports the Bel-
gian nuclear safety authority and participated as
a permanent member in the work of a correspond-
ing Lithuanian advisory committee.
STUK’s co-operation with the USNRC focused
on information exchange in nuclear safety matters
of interest to both parties. A STUK-representative
worked at the USNRC as a visiting expert for one
year. In addition, STUK continued, in cooperation
with the USNRC and VTT, development of the
FRAPTRAN/GENFLO code for fuel transients.
The USNRC and STUK drew up and signed a co-
operation agreement on the matter. The first pro-
gramme version was installed at PNNL (Pacific
North-West National Laboratory) and commis-
sioned at VTT. Additionally, and in co-operation
with Fortum Service, ANL (Argonne National Lab-
oratory) was provided with Zrl%Nb cladding ma-
terial for the USNRC’s LOCA tests.
STUK continued co-operation with the French
nuclear safety authority support organisation
IRSN regarding probabilistic safety analysis (PSA)
related information exchange and development of
fire risk analysis methods.
Co-operation between STUK and the Russian
nuclear safety authority (GAN) in the field of
nuclear material and waste control continued
based on a co-operation arrangement signed in
1998.
Safeguards co-operation between STUK and
the Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation
Office (ASNO) was continued. STUK provided
ASNO with information about nuclear materials
imported to and kept in Finland.
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT)
The National Data Centre (NDC), which operates
in conjunction with STUK, is based on the Com-
prehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It contribut-
ed to the work of the preparatory commission for
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Or-
ganisation (CTBTO) to establish a cost-effective
organisation that is functional also from the Finn-
ish point of view. Personnel from radiation moni-
toring stations belonging to the international ob-
servation network to verify compliance with the
Treaty were trained to assure the operation of the
stations. The NDC’s own automatic, routine moni-
toring was in operation for the whole year. An
alarm system was developed for use in routine
monitoring, to transmit data on unusual observa-
tions to the NDC’s personnel. The NDC observed
no abnormal activity in 2002.
The suitability of the analysis programme used
by the DNC to analyse radioactive noble gas
samples was assured.
STUK signed an agreement with the makers of
the analysis programme about its handing over to
the national data centres of other countries for use
in CTBT work.
Other forms of co-operation
STUK participated in the work of the Western
European Nuclear Regulators’ Association (WEN-
RA) and arranged the Association’s meeting in
Helsinki in November. The development and feasi-
bility testing of a method for use in the harmoni-
sation of nuclear safety requirements was com-
pleted in 2002. A pilot-type assessment of harmo-
nisation needs with recommendations on six safe-
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ty topics was completed. The representatives of
the nuclear safety authorities of eight West Euro-
pean countries participated in the work. A more
extensive project was proposed to WENRA, con-
sisting 15 new safety topics.
The VVER Forum, a form of co-operation of
safety authorities of countries operating WWER-
type nuclear facilities, assembled in Hungary in
July. The Forum’s working group on Equipment
and Building Structures Ageing Management for
WWER type nuclear power plants had completed
its work on the ageing phenomena of steam gener-
ators. The group’s final report was presented at
the Forum’s meeting. Under the leadership of
STUK, a new working group was set up at the
meeting to compare probabilistic safety analyses.
STUK was also assigned the task of arranging a
seminar on regulators’ inspection practices per-
taining to plant operation and their comparison as
continuation to similar seminars in Russia and
Ukraine.
STUK participated in the work of the Network
of Regulators of Countries with Small Nuclear
Programmes (NERS). Topics of special importance
in 2002 were validity of regulatory guides, inde-
pendence of computer software used by regulators
and licensees for safety analysis as well as qualifi-
cation of non-destructive testing methods. In 2002
NERS met once in Bratislava.
Vivid information exchange took place and two
expert meetings were arranged within the DOC-
UM Project designed to develop regulations appli-
cable to the service life management of nuclear
facilities (PLIM). A STUK expert assessment of
PLIM information systems specifically suited for
Russian nuclear facilities, based on operational
experience feedback on Finnish nuclear facilities,
was handed over to the Russian International
Nuclear Safety Centre (RINSC). The DOCUM
Project having thus ended, an assistance project
for the realisation of PLIM information systems
was launched, with financing from the budget on
co-operation with neighbouring countries of the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the target of which is
Leningrad nuclear power plant. Implementation
is based on a pressure equipment inspection data
management system developed by Fortum Engi-
neering.
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11 The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety
In accordance with section 56 of the Nuclear Ener-
gy Act, the preliminary preparation of matters re-
lated to the safe use of nuclear energy is vested
with the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety.
The Government appoints the Committee that
functions in conjunction with STUK. The term of
office is three years. The Committee was reinstat-
ed on 16 August 2000 and its current term of office
ends 15 August 2003.
The Committee’s Chairman is Professor Pentti
Lautala (Tampere University of Technology) and
its Vice-Chairman is Head of Research Rauno
Rintamaa (Technical Research Centre of Finland,
VTT). In 2002 the members were Senior Research-
er Riitta Kyrki-Rajamäki (VTT), Professor Ulla
Lähteenmäki (Centre for Metrology and Accredi-
tation), Director Olli Pahkala (Ministry of the
Environment), Professor Rainer Salomaa (Helsin-
ki University of Technology), Branch Manager
Paavo Vuorela (the Geological Survey of Finland).
Professor Jukka Laaksonen, Director General of
STUK, is a permanent expert to the Committee.
Invited experts are Doctor of Technology Antti
Vuorinen and Director Christer Viktorsson (the
Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate). The Com-
mittee convened seven times in 2002. Professor
Lähteenmäki retired during the year and Director
Ulla Koivusaari from the Pirkanmaa Regional
Environment Centre was assigned in his place by
the Government.
The Committee has three divisions for prepara-
tory work: a Reactor Safety Division, a Nuclear
Waste Division as well as an Emergency Prepar-
edness and Nuclear Material Division. In addition
to the Committee members proper, distinguished
experts from various fields have been invited to
the Divisions. A total of five Division meetings
were held in 2002.
In 2002 the Committee processed eight YVL
draft guides submitted by STUK for comment.
Statements were issued on six draft guides, two
statements were postponed to 2003. The Commit-
tee regularly followed operating events at domes-
tic and Swedish nuclear power plants and ac-
quainted itself with, among others, changes in
nuclear liability, renewed national safety research
programmes, progress of the project on a fifth
reactor, on-going nuclear safeguards enlargement
and international activities in the field of nuclear
safety (OECD/NEA, WENRA, the EU).
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A Indicators on safety of nuclear power plants (regulatory effectiveness)
A.I SAFETY AND QUALITY CULTURE
A.I.1 Failures and their repair
A.I.1a Failures of components subject to the Technical Specifications
A.I.1b Maintenance of components subject to the Technical Specifications
A.I.1c Repair time of components subject to the Technical Specifications
A.I.1.d Human-based maintenance errors
A.I.1.e Common-cause failures preventing operation
A.I.1.f Potential common-cause failures
A.I.1.g Capability loss due to failures
A.I.2 Exemptions and deviations from the Technical Specifications
A.I.3 Unavailability of safety systems
A.I.4 Occupational radiation safety
A.I.4.a Annual collective doses
A.I.4.b Average of the ten highest individual doses
A.I.5 Releases
A.I.5.a Radioactive releases into the atmosphere
A.I.5.b Radioactive releases into the sea
A.I.5.c Individual radiation doses calculated for the most exposed
population group in the environment of the nuclear power plant
A.I.6 Keeping documentation current
A.I.7 Investments on facilities
A.2 OPERATIONAL EVENTS
A.II.1 Number of events
A.II.2 Risk significant of events
A.II.3 Causes of events
A.II.4 Number of fire alarms
A.3 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
A.III.1 Integrity of nuclear fuel
A.III.2 Integrity of primary circuit
A.III.3 Integrity of containment
APPENDIX 1 STUK’s safety and performance
indicators
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B Indicators on regulatory activities (regulatory efficiency)
B.I WORKING PROCESSES
B.I.1 Methods of directing and processes
B.I.2 Requirements on the safety of nuclear facilities
B.I.2a Share of updated YVL guides compared to annual plan
B.I.2b Share of YVL guides over five years old
B.I.2c Share of YVL guides over ten years old
B.I.3 Compliance with the Quality System
B.I.3a Implementation of results plan
B.I.3b Quality non-conformances observed by management review
B.I.3.c Timely decision-making
B.I.3.d Implementation of the inspection programme
B.I.3.e Steering of contracted safety research
B.I.3.f Focusing of resources
B.I.4 Efficiency of emergency response
B.I.4.a Number of individuals contacted during liaison testing
B.I.4.b Number of individuals participating in emergency exercises
B.I.5 Customer feedback
B.II RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND FINANCES
B.II.1 Structure of financing
B.II.2 Cost awareness of operations
B.II.3 Resource management
B.III RENEWAL AND WORKING ABILITY
B.III.1 Wellbeing of personnel
B.III.1.a Work satisfaction
B.III.1.b Work load
B.III.1.c Absences
B.III.2 Know-how
B.III.2a Participating in training
B.III.2b Implementation of training programme
B.III.3 Availability of information required at work
B.III.3a Development of YTV Quality Manual
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APPENDIX 2 Licences and approvals in
accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act
C214/232, 5 March 2002, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Import from /export to Sweden of zirconium tubes
(48 kg). Valid until 31 December 2002.
C214/233, 5 March 2002, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Import of control rods (12 pcs) from Sweden. Valid
until 31 December 2002.
A214/35, 25 June 2002, Fortum Power and
Heat Oy
Import of connecting rods (10 pcs) and a control
rod mechanism protection pipe (1 pcs) from the
Czech Republic. Valid until 31 December 2002.
C214/234, 16 October 2002, Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Import of zirconium tubes (5 pcs, 10 kg) from Swe-
den. Valid until 31.12.2002.
P214-8/2, 7 November 2002, VTT Processes
Import from England of uranium oxide pellets
made of enriched uranium. Valid until 31 January
2003.
A214/38, 11 November 2002, Fortum Power
and Heat Oy
Import of a control rod drive mechanism guide
tube from Hungary. Valid until 31 December 2002.
C214/235, 13 November 2002,
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Import of fresh nuclear fuel from the Federal Re-
public of Germany. Max 15 100 kg of enriched ura-
nium. Provided with the Euratom control stamp
“P”. Obligations of the Finnish-Russian co-opera-
tion agreement on the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy apply to the uranium. Valid until 31 De-
cember 2003.
C214/238, 9 December 2002,
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Import of fresh nuclear fuel from the Federal Re-
public of Germany. Max 5 750 kg enriched urani-
um. Provided with the Euratom control stamp “P”.
Valid until 31 December 2003.
C214/239, 11 December 2002,
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Import of fresh nuclear fuel from Sweden. Max
18 200 kg of enriched uranium. The obligations of
the exchange of notes pertaining to the peaceful
uses of nuclear materials between the authorities
of Finland and the People’s Republic of China ap-
ply to 73 fuel bundles. Provided with the Euratom
control stamp “P”. Valid until 31 December 2002.
F214/13, 13 December 2002, VTT Processes
Export to and import from the USA of control rod
drive mechanisms (3 pcs) for use as spare parts.
Valid until 31 December 2005.
C214/240/, 19 December 2002,
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
Import of fresh nuclear fuel from Sweden. Max
2 250 kg of enriched uranium in the form of fresh
nuclear fuel (number of bundles is tentatively 12).
Provided with the Euratom control stamp “P”. Val-
id until 31 December 2002.
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Inspection programme 2002
Basic programme Loviisa power plant Olkiluoto power plant
A Safety management X
B Main functions
B1 Assessment and improvement of safety
B2 Operation X
B3 Plant maintenance X
C Inspections by functional unit and field of competence
C1 Plant safety functions X X
C2 Electrical and I & C systems X X
C3 Mechanical engineering X X
C4 Construction engineering and structural engineering X
C5 PSA and utilisation of fault statistics X X
C6 Information management X
C7 Chemistry X X
C8 Nuclear waste X X
C9 Radiation protection X X
C10 Fire protection X X
C11 Emergency preparedness X X
C12 Physical protection X X
C13 Quality assurance X
APPENDIX 3 Periodic inspection programme
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APPENDIX 4 Safety improvements
Loviisa power plant
Mitigation of severe accidents at Loviisa 2
A large number of measures to mitigate the conse-
quences of severe accidents were carried out dur-
ing the Loviisa 2 annual maintenance outage of
2002. Similar actions were carried out at Loviisa 1
in 2000–2001. They are part of an on-going Loviisa
power plant project providing for severe accidents,
which is nearing completion.
The technically most extensive of these actions
was the implementation of plant modifications
required by the reactor pressure vessel’s external
cooling. For this purpose, flow routes between the
steam generator room and the reactor pit were
opened and configured; and the lowering equip-
ment of the reactor pressure vessel’s heat shield
was fitted in place. STUK oversaw the modifica-
tions and the associated site acceptance tests.
After the completion of these modifications, the
hot corium melt that would form in a severe
accident could be contained inside the reactor
pressure vessel by vessel external cooling.
Hydrogen is released inside the containment in
severe accidents. Plans are to install catalytic
recombiners inside the containment to burn hy-
drogen without quick explosive fires. For the same
purpose, opening mechanisms have been planned
for the doors of the ice condenser compartment
located inside the containment. The opening mech-
anisms assure supply of air to all parts of the
containment for the catalytic burning of hydrogen
released in a severe accident. They also limit local
hydrogen concentrations, making flaming unlike-
ly. The installation of the opening mechanisms and
their nitrogen operating system were completed at
Loviisa 2. The acquisition of catalytic recombiners
has started and installation at both plant units is
due in 2003.
Several new measurements and displays were
installed to monitor measures relating to reactor
pressure vessel external cooling and hydrogen
management. A small part of the measurement
installations were not completed because the com-
ponents received were not up to the requirements.
The scope of installations implemented is suffi-
cient for temporary use and any shortcomings will
be put right in 2003.
In addition, several modifications relating to
I&C technology were made at the plant unit and
new I&C systems were installed to facilitate cen-
tralised severe accident management. The option
of manually tripping containment isolation signals
necessary for the maintenance of containment
leak tightness was provided, among others. These
manually tripped special functions assure contain-
ment leak tightness against potential system
leaks.
Replacement of radiation measurements
at Loviisa 1
The replacement of fixed radiation measurements
is underway at Loviisa plant. Loviisa 1 commis-
sioned 58 new radiation monitors in the annual
maintenance outage. Replacement of radiation
monitoring devices in the ventilation stack was
started towards the end of 2002. The renewed
monitors will be commissioned in early 2003. The
fixed radiation measurement system of Loviisa 2
is due for renewal in the 2003 annual mainte-
nance outage.
The measurement system of Loviisa nuclear
power plant comprises a total of ca. 140 independ-
ently operating monitoring devices that follow the
radiation loads in the plant’s rooms and processes.
Some of the devices are capable of functioning
even in severe accidents.
The system’s upgrading became necessary be-
cause of the difficulty of getting spare parts for the
old equipment that had been in service for over 20
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years; consequently, repair times were getting
longer. New radiation monitoring technologies
yield data more versatile and accurate than before
on the radiation loads of measured objects. Be-
sides the control room and the monitors’ local
displays, data from the monitoring devices can be
directly utilised in the work locations of those
responsible to control radioactivity and to main-
tain radiation monitoring and monitoring devices.
Some of the new devices can be easily moved if
needed, facilitating an improved focusing of radia-
tion measurements.
Reduction of risk from containment
external leaks
Modifications to reduce the risk of leaks exceeding
5 kg/s from the primary circuit to outside the con-
tainment via different systems, which were start-
ed at both Loviisa plant units in 2000, were con-
tinued. The need for the modifications surfaced
during the updating of the plant units’ probabilis-
tic safety analysis. In connection with the updat-
ing, the utility assessed leak routes and analysed
the consequences of leaks, among others. The most
significant consequences are a rising temperature
and humidity caused by steam discharged for ex-
ample in the transmitter rooms in the ground floor
of the reactor building. Elevated temperatures and
humidity can cause instrumentation malfunctions.
The major part of potential primary circuit
leaks to outside the containment are through the
primary water purification system. These leaks
are isolated by the closure in three phases of the
primary water purification system valves. In the
first phase the operator can close the shut-off
valves and assure a continued supply of sealing
water to the primary coolant pumps by opening a
supply route from the normal make-up water
system. The continued supply of sealing water is
also assured by the automatic starting up of the
emergency sealing water system. In the second
phase, the shut-off valves of the primary circuit
purification system close from a protection signal
generated by a pressuriser level that is too low.
The supply of sealing water to the primary coolant
pumps is then assured by a changeover of supply.
In the third phase, the aforementioned shut-off
valves close from another protection signal caused
by the pressuriser level and generated by the
plant protection system. The modifications were
completed in the 2002 annual maintenance out-
age.
The suction line of the emergency sealing wa-
ter system was moved from the primary circuit to
the sealing water line in the 2002 outage. After
the modification emergency sealing water leak-
throughs and heat exchanger ruptures are auto-
matically isolated by the closing of the primary
circuit purification system valves from a low pres-
suriser level signal. The supply of emergency seal-
ing water is automatically assured by the opening
of a supply route from the normal make-up water
system and by starting the system’s other pump
abreast with the running pump.
After the modification has been completed a
heat exchanger tube rupture in the primacy cool-
ant pump sealing water system is automatically
isolated by the closure from a pressure difference
signal of the valves of the cooling circuit of the
leaking heat exchanger.
Reduction of risk from minor
containment external leaks
Modifications have been implemented at both
Loviisa plant units to reduce the risk of leaks less
than 5 kg/s from the primary circuit to outside the
containment through primary and secondary sys-
tems. The need for the modifications surfaced dur-
ing the updating of the plant units’ probabilistic
safety analyses. According to the analyses, the
most significant initiating events are the ruptur-
ing of measuring and sampling lines as well as of
the control rod cooling coil, which could cause the
malfunctioning of transmitters important to safe-
ty due to quick temperature increases in the reac-
tor building transmitter rooms.
In the 2002 annual maintenance outages the
shut-off valves of the control rod drive cooling
system were moved from a plant protection group
tested once a week to a protection group tested
once a year. The modification reduces the testing-
related risk of a leak through the cooling coils to
the cooling system. In addition, the sampling lines
of the steam generator were moved from the I&C
room to another room to prevent the warming up
of the I&C room and penetrations.
In a measuring or sampling line break, the
functioning of the flow limiters of leaking lines
significantly affect ambient conditions and risk.
When the capacity of the flow limiters of measur-
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ing lines was looked into, a need for further
testing was found. The tests were carried out in
spring 2002. The results showed that the capacity
of the flow limiters needs to be reassessed.
The installation of additional flow limiters to
the impulse lines of reactor measurements, due
for implementation at Loviisa 1 in 2002, has been
postponed to 2004.
Replacement of low pressure emergency
cooling system pumps
The replacement of the pumps of the low pressure
cooling system of Loviisa 1 was begun in the 2000
annual maintenance outage: two pumps were re-
placed and the necessary piping modifications
were made. Pump replacements and piping modi-
fications were completed at both plant units in the
2002 annual maintenance  outages. At Loviisa 1,
the remaining two low pressure emergency sys-
tem pumps and at Loviisa 2 all four pumps were
replaced.
The low pressure emergency cooling system is
only used in accidents to refill the reactor and
maintain long-term core cooling. The system com-
prises two redundant, independent sub-systems
with two redundant pumps in each (four pumps in
all). Even one operating pump can handle the
cooling function during an accident.
The replacement of the old pumps was neces-
sary because of their structural deficiencies. In
connection with their replacement, the mechani-
cal stresses from piping to the pumps could be
reduced as well. The new type of pump is more
efficient than the original and capable of injecting
water against a pressure higher than before; the
capacity of the low pressure emergency cooling
system was thus improved as well.
Removal of water seal cross-tie lines from
the primary circuit of Loviisa 2
The water seal cross-tie lines of the primary loops
of Loviisa 2 were removed in the annual mainte-
nance outage. This small-diameter piping was lo-
cated in three of the plant unit’s six loops between
bends in the cold and hot legs of primary piping.
The cross-tie lines were installed in the early
1980s to ward off the water seal phenomenon,
which was assumed to compromise reactor core
cooling during a primary circuit leak. Current
knowledge, based on experimental studies and
analyses, considers the cross-tie lines unnecessary.
Their removal eliminated the possibility of a pri-
mary circuit leak through them. Grounds for the
removal of the cross-tie lines are given in the an-
nual report 2000 (STUK-B-YTO 208).
The water seal cross-tie lines of Loviisa 1 were
removed in 2000.
Olkiluoto power plant
Upgrading of the reactor control rod
manoeuvring and position indication
system of Olkiluoto 1
The reactor control rod manoeuvring and position
indication system of the Olkiluoto 1 reactor was
upgraded in the 2002 annual maintenance outage.
The upgrading made control of the rods more ac-
curate, improved their position data and test re-
porting, and reduced failures. The modification
also reduced the probability of erroneous control
rod withdrawal.
An upgrading of the same system was carried
out in the Olkiluoto 2 annual maintenance outage
of 2001 already. The system’s implementation was
changed for some parts, based on experience, but
its layout and operation corresponds to the de-
scription given in the 2001 annual report (STUK-
B-YTO 216). Similar repairs were made at Olkiluo-
to 2 in the annual maintenance outage.
The personnel lock of the Olkiluoto 2
containment building was strengthened
Over the past years modifications have been im-
plemented at the Olkiluoto units to improve prep-
aration for severe accidents. In the 2002 annual
maintenance outage, the personnel lock of the con-
tainment building of Olkiluoto 2 was strength-
ened. After the modification the containment
building withstands significantly heavier individ-
ual pressure shocks than before. Such shocks could
occur in a severe accident involving a core melt
penetrating the reactor pressure vessel walls and
ending up in the water pool of the containment
building drywell. Under specific circumstances,
the interaction of core melt and water could cause
a steam explosion. A similar modification was
made at Olkiluoto 1 in 2001.
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The opening condition of the valves of the
core spray system was changed
The desks in the main control rooms of the
Olkiluoto plant units were fitted with valve-specif-
ic selector switches by which the operating range
of the core spray system, which is dependent on
the reactor water level, can be changed to assure
emergency cooling under certain accident condi-
tions.
The core spray system takes care of reactor
emergency cooling in the event of the breaking of
large-diameter piping inside the containment. Wa-
ter intake for the system’s pumps is from the
condensation pool of the containment building’s
wet well, through the strainers of the pool. New
accident analyses conducted in connection with
the power uprates of the plant units in the late 90s
revealed that, in certain rare accident situations,
the functioning of the core spray system could be
in jeopardy when the condensation pool level
decreases to strainer level. The analyses indicate
that this would be possible if a pipe breaks in the
gap between the reactor and its thermal shield.
The greater part of the leak water would then
trickle down to the containment building drywell
below the reactor; it would become trapped there
and would not be available for use by the core
spray system.
Reactor cooling in such a situation is assured
by altering, if the accident situation so requires,
the operating range of the core spray system,
which is dependent on the reactor water level. If
the condensation pool level decreases so much in
an accident that it approaches the upper edge of
the core spray system strainers, the operator can,
by valve-specific selector switches, alter the sys-
tem’s operating mode such that water injection
into the reactor is stopped when the condensation
pool level goes below normal level. In an accident
situation water is injected into the reactor also by
the auxiliary feed water system, whose water
intake is external to the containment building.
The system has sufficient capacity to cool down
the reactor after the initial phase of an accident as
well as to maintain the reactor level high enough
to keep the core spray system from injecting water
into the reactor. If the reactor level decreases close
to the upper edge of the core, however, the core
spray system automatically starts water injection
into the reactor.
STUK approved a decision-in-principle for the
management of the condensation pool level in an
accident. The modification was implemented at
both plant units in the 2002 outage. STUK ap-
proved the selector switches and push buttons for
use until the 2003 annual maintenance outage, at
which time they are due for replacement by higher
quality components.
Replacement of rotating converters with
UPS equipment
A modification project was launched at the
Olkiluoto plant units during the 2001 annual
maintenances to replace ageing rotating direct/al-
ternating current converters with modern UPS
equipment. A rotating converter unit comprised a
direct-current motor rotating an alternating cur-
rent generator. A UPS consists of a direct and al-
ternating current unit as well as of a stand-by
battery. The converter and the UPS handle power
supply to the battery-backed 400 V alternating
current system under the plant units’ all opera-
tional conditions. The battery-backed 400 V alter-
nating current system mainly supplies power to
the actuators of valves important to safety.
Both Olkiluoto plant units had a total of four
converters. They were replaced due to their in-
creased maintenance costs, low efficiency and age-
ing-induced malfunctions.
In the 2001 annual maintenance outages,
Olkiluoto 1 installed and commissioned one and
Olkiluoto 2 two new UPSs. The remaining five
UPSs were installed and commissioned during the
plant units’ 2002 annual maintenance outages.
Modernisation of the process interface of
process computers at Olkiluoto 1
In the 2002 annual maintenance outage of
Olkiluoto 1, the oldest computers plus their proc-
ess interface equipment were upgraded and pro-
vided with user interfaces. The process interface
gathers and transmits measurement and condi-
tion data to the process computer system and the
process automation system user interface. For an-
alogue data gathering, the upgraded equipment
constitute a new system called “Data gathering
and temperature monitoring system”. The power
supplies and data buses of its processors have been
doubled for assured availability. The new system
also conducts temperature measurement related
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controls. In addition, it monitors signal limits and
carries out alarm functions and further delivery of
signals to the control and alarm panels of the con-
trol room, conducts operating time calculations for
electric motors, and gathers and calculates trends.
The upgraded alarm computer constitutes a
system of its own. It collects binary event data on
processes and transmits them to the process com-
puter through the new system.
Similar modifications will be implemented at
Olkiluoto 2 in the 2003 annual maintenance. Work
in preparation for these modifications was carried
out in the 2002 annual maintenance outage.
The suspended ceilings of control rooms
were renewed
The renewal of the suspended ceilings of control
rooms at both Olkiluoto plant units was complet-
ed. The work was started after the making of a
probabilistic seismic analysis for the plant units.
The analysis mentioned as one risk factor that the
suspended ceiling and lighting fixtures of the con-
trol rooms might fall off during a hypothetical
earthquake. The plastic components of the light-
ing fixtures had also become brittle from heat over
their 25 years of use, and they could have fallen
off, placing the shift personnel at risk and damag-
ing the control desks. In addition, the control room
personnel were unhappy about lighting, ventila-
tion and the background sound level.
The renewal of the suspended ceiling of the
Olkiluoto 1 control room was started in August
2002. A test installation of the scaffolding required
in the construction of the suspended ceiling was
conducted first. The test installation was done in
the back of the Olkiluoto 1 control room where
there are no equipment important to nuclear safety.
At Olkiluoto 2 the renewal was carried out after
that of Olkiluoto 1 and was completed in Novem-
ber 2002. The modifications were carried out dur-
ing normal power operation when control room
operations require less personnel than during out-
ages. In addition, entry of outsiders into the con-
trol room during the work was limited.
STUK reviewed the construction and work
plans and daily followed the modification process
by participating in follow-up meetings arranged
by the licensee and by making inspections to the
work site. In addition, STUK inspected the modifi-
cations after their completion. STUK did not ob-
serve any situations endangering personnel or
nuclear safety or hindering working in the control
room.
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APPENDIX 5 Annual maintenance outages
Olkiluoto 2 annual maintenance
Olkiluoto 2 underwent annual maintenance from
5 to 13 May 2002. This was a refuelling outage,
which included minor preventive maintenance
work, repairs and modifications. It lasted seven
days and seven hours, i.e. about 12 hours less than
planned.
A leaking fuel assembly was removed from the
plant unit’s reactor during the outage. The leak
was discovered in February 2002. Prior to the
start of the outage, on 4 May 2002, the leaking
assembly was located to an area of four fuel
assemblies and in the outage to a single fuel
assembly by means of assembly-specific leak de-
tection.
Safety-significant plant modifications imple-
mented during the annual maintenance outage
are described in Appendix 4.
The outage-induced collective radiation dose
was 0.26 manSv. According to guidelines set by
STUK, the threshold value for the collective dose
for an Olkiluoto plant unit is 2.10 manSv aver-
aged over two successive years. The highest indi-
vidual dose incurred during the Olkiluoto 2 annu-
al maintenance of 2002 was 3.95 mSv. The Radia-
tion Decree prescribes that the annual effective
dose to a radiation worker may not exceed 50 mSv.
Olkiluoto 1 annual maintenance
Olkiluoto 1 underwent annual maintenance from
14 to 27 May 2002. It was a maintenance outage
during which more maintenance work, repairs and
modifications are carried out than during a refuel-
ling outage. The outage lasted 13 days and seven
hours, i.e. almost 24 hours less than planned.
In addition to refuelling, the most significant
work during the outage included an internal in-
spection of the reactor vessel nozzles using new
inspection equipment, a generator repair and nu-
merous electrical and I&C systems renovations,
among others. Safety-significant modifications are
described in Appendix 4.
The outage-induced collective radiation dose
was 0.712 manSv. The highest individual dose
incurred during the Olkiluoto 1 annual mainte-
nance of 2002 was 9.05 mSv and the total for both
plant units was 9.25 mSv.
Loviisa 1 annual maintenance
The Loviisa 1 annual maintenance of 2002 was a
medium-duration maintenance and refuelling out-
age from 20 July to 16 August 2002. The outage
lasted 28 days, i.e. 24 hours longer than planned.
In addition to refuelling plus normal inspections,
maintenance and repairs, significant modifications
and repairs on the primary and secondary side
were carried out.
Work was continued on modifications to reduce
the risk from leaks external to the containment.
Pump replacements in the low pressure emergen-
cy cooling system and piping modifications were
completed during the outage. In addition, renewal
of the plant unit’s fixed radiation measurements
was started. These projects are further explained
in Appendix 4.
The replacement of steam generator feed water
distributors, started in mid-90s, was completed
during the outage. The plant unit has a total of six
steam generators. The new feed water distributors
are not as prone to erosion-corrosion as were the
old ones and they are easier to maintain. The
sealing rings of primary coolant pumps were re-
placed after which oscillations, such as were ob-
served during the plant unit’s start-ups from pre-
vious outages, among others, did not occur during
the start-up from this outage. The re-coating of a
floor area damaged by a water leak into the steam
generator room during the 2000 annual mainte-
nance was continued. Almost a half of the floor
area is re-coated now. The biggest job on the
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secondary side was the replacement of a genera-
tor’s excitation system.
In this outage the licensee inspected the outer
surfaces of the reactor vessel head area. The
inspections were performed after an eroded reac-
tor pressure vessel head was detected in February
2002 at the US Davis Besse plant, which is a PWR
plant as is Loviisa plant. No signs of erosion were
detected in the inspections at Loviisa plant.
During the outage the boric acid concentration
of the primary circuit briefly went a little below
the threshold given in the Technical Specifica-
tions. The event is described in detail in Appen-
dix 6.
The outage-induced collective radiation dose
was 0.99 manSv. According to guidelines set by
STUK, the threshold value for the collective dose
for a Loviisa plant unit is 1.22 manSv averaged
over two successive years. The annual collective
radiation dose is mostly incurred in outage work.
The highest individual dose during the Loviisa 1
annual maintenance of 2002 was 11.4 mSv. The
Radiation Decree prescribes that the annual effec-
tive dose to a radiation worker may not exceed
50 mSv.
Loviisa 2 annual maintenance
Loviisa 2 underwent annual maintenance from 24
August to 12 October 2002. This was an extended
maintenance outage during which all fuel assem-
blies were moved to the refuelling pool for reactor
pressure vessel inspections. All normal refuelling,
preventive maintenance, repair and modification
work was carried out as well. The outage lasted for
about 50 days, i.e. about 12 days longer than
planned. It’s duration was extended among others
by faults in the reactor pressure vessel inspection
equipment, an extended reactor core inspection
and an additional inspection of the gasket units of
the primary coolant pumps, among others. The pri-
mary circuit’s heating had to be discontinued and
it had to be cooled down for the gasket unit inspec-
tions.
The making of modifications to improve severe
accident management and to reduce risks from
leaks external to the containment was continued.
Pump replacements in the low pressure emergen-
cy cooling system of Loviisa 2 were completed. In
addition, the water-seal cross-tie line of the plant
unit’s primary circuit was removed as redundant.
These modifications are described in more detail
in Appendix 4.
In the inspections carried out by the licensee
during the annual maintenance outage, cracks
were observed in the protection pipes of control
rod drive mechanisms connecting to the primary
circuit and also in the liner plate of the core
basket belonging to the reactor internals. Also the
fastening screws of the liner plate were damaged.
These observations are described in more detail in
Appendix 6.
The reactor vessel head area of Loviisa 2 was
also inspected and no corrosion was detected.
The outage-induced collective radiation dose
was 1.50 manSv. The highest individual dose dur-
ing the annual maintenance was 15.4 mSv. The
highest individual dose for both Loviisa 1 and 2
annual maintenances was 19.2 mSv.
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APPENDIX 6 Significant operational events
Loviisa power plant
Preventive maintenance work not in
compliance with the Technical
Specifications
Preventive maintenance work was performed at
the Loviisa plant units on 14 March 2002 due to
which the redundant subsystems of the reactor
containment external spray system at Loviisa 1
were not fully operable for about nine hours.
The external spray system prevents contain-
ment over pressurisation in severe accidents as
well as potential uncontrolled radioactive releases
that may follow. The system is actuated from its
own control room when containment pressure
reaches design pressure. Two diesel generators
assure power supply to the systems. Each plant
unit’s diesel generator can supply power to the
systems of both plant units.
The preventive maintenance of the diesel gen-
erator of the Loviisa 2 spray system was begun at
8.20 hours. During the maintenance, one Loviisa 1
spray system pump operated without diesel gener-
ator back-up. The Technical Specifications allowed
a maximum of 21 days for the work. The Loviisa 1
control room was provided with copies of the work
order for the maintenance work at Loviisa 2 and
the shift manager entered this in the daily log. By
mistake, and almost simultaneously, he gave per-
mission to clean the filter of the system’s other
pump. The work was completed at 18.00 hours.
The spray system’s pumps were not operational
during the work: the power supply of one pump
had no diesel generator back-up and the other
pump had been removed from service entirely. The
Technical Specifications allow such a situation
during a malfunction but during preventive main-
tenance the inoperability of only one subsystem at
a time is allowed.
The event was of minor safety significance. It
showed, however, that compliance with the limita-
tions of the Technical Specifications needed im-
provement where preventive maintenance of sys-
tems shared by the plant units is concerned. The
event is INES Level 0.
The timing of preventive maintenance work at
Loviisa plant unit will be reviewed on account of
the event. In addition, the specific features and
meaning of systems shared by both plant units
will be underlined in the training given to the
operating and maintenance personnel.
Two isolation valves at Loviisa 1 were not
tested in 2001
In a review by STUK in April 2002 of the result
report on the leak tightness tests of the Loviisa 1
containment it was detected that two successive
isolation valves of the cooling system of the reac-
tor control rod drives had not been tested in the
2001 annual maintenance outage. This was due to
an ambiguous listing of valves to be excluded from
testing in the 2001 annual maintenance, which
caused erroneous interpretations.
The isolation valves are usually tested once a
year. The testing interval for the pair of valves in
question had been extended to two years because
their leak tightness had proved good in earlier
tests. The valves had last been tested in the 2000
annual maintenance and had been found very
leaktight. According to the Technical Specifica-
tions, they should also have been tested in 2001
because the actuator of one valve (S009) was
replaced in 2000. The valves have been subjected
to regular functional testing during operation and
have been found to close. Since the other valve
(S008) had not been modified in a way affecting its
leak tightness the leak tightness of the penetra-
tion is assumed good.
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The event was classified INES Level 0.
To prevent erroneous interpretations, training
was given on leakage testing practices and the
test monitoring software was made available to a
wider group of users. In addition, Loviisa plant
will pay attention to the sufficiently wide distribu-
tion of documents on maintenance work and on
the timing of maintenance.
The valves were found highly leaktight in a
leak tightness test conducted during the 2002
annual maintenance.
Primary circuit boric acid concentration
decreased below the limit of the Technical
Specifications
The boric acid concentration of the Loviisa 1 pri-
mary circuit on 29 July 2002 went below the 13 g/
kg limit of the Technical Specifications (TTKE).
The plant unit’s annual maintenance outage was
underway at the time. The clean water that was
used to flush the reactor pit caused the boric acid
concentration to decrease below the limit. The de-
crease in concentration was minor and of a brief
duration. Since the water was also well mixed, the
margin to criticality of the reactor remained high
during the entire event.
The reactor pit is the pool space above the
reactor pressure vessel that, after the head’s re-
moval, connects to the reactor and is filled with
boric acid water for the duration of fuel loading.
The steel lining of the walls of the reactor pit is
flushed with clean water after the water level has
been lowered after reactor loading. The steel lin-
ing needs washing to remove impurities causing
radioactive exposure. In this case the flushing of
the reactor pit had to be discontinued several
times due to testing and operation of the plant
systems, which is why more water than usual was
used in the flushing.
In addition to control rod insertion into the
reactor, reactor subcriticality is ensured by boric
acid during outages. Boric acid concentration is
measured by continuous analyser monitoring and
by manual laboratory analyses at regular inter-
vals. The continuous analyser monitoring function
has been provided with alarm limits to indicate
when the measuring value approaches the limit
values of the Technical Specifications. When an
alarm limit is reached an alarm appears on the
process computer display. Alarms abound during
an outage, however, to the extent that, in this case,
the operator did not notice the alarms indicating a
low boric acid concentration. The reaching of the
alarm limit was noticed in the laboratory when
the results yielded by continuous analyser moni-
toring were followed on the process computer. The
low boric acid concentration was noticed to the
control room and was double-checked by an extra
laboratory analysis. The analysis yielded a boric
acid concentration of 12.9 g/kg, which is below the
limit of the Technical Specifications. The operator
immediately began injection of strong boric acid
solution into the primary circuit, restoring the
circuit’s boric acid concentration to the allowable
range of the Technical Specifications.
The event was attributed to insufficient in-
structions on the flushing of the reactor pit and
insufficient monitoring of the boric acid concentra-
tion. A reactor physics safety evaluation showed
that dilution was slow and that clean water mixed
well with the boric acid water of the primary
circuit. The low boric acid concentration thus had
no immediate effect on safety. The event was
classified Level 1 on the INES Scale.
Loviisa plant revised the instructions and pro-
cedures for reactor pit flushing after the event.
The new instructions and procedures were al-
ready in use in the Loviisa 2 outage of 2002. The
detectability of alarms and the re-determination
of boric acid concentration limits for the Technical
Specifications among others have been assessed as
the long-term development needs of Loviisa plant.
The licensee will assess the necessary corrective
measures also in connection with the event’s root
cause analysis to be completed at a later date.
Cracking of the control rod drive
mechanism protection pipes in the Loviisa 2
primary circuit
Areas of the protection pipes of control rod drive
mechanisms containing temperature measure-
ment devices were inspected in the Loviisa 2 an-
nual maintenance outage since, on 18 December
2001, a small leak had been detected in one pro-
tection pipe (Annual Report 2001; STUK-B-YTO
216). Crystallised boric acid on surfaces, originat-
ing from boric acid water recirculating in the pri-
mary circuit, lead to the leak’s detection. In in-
spections performed in the 2002 outage, non-pene-
trating cracks propagating from the outer surface
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Figure A6.1. Control rod drive mechanism protection
pipes and a temperature measurement device insulation
shield box. The photograph was taken at ca. ten metres
above the reactor vessel head area. Photo by STUK.
Figure A6.2. Crystallised boric acid on a temperature
measurement device’s insulation shield box. The
photograph is of a leak at Loviisa 2 observed on 18
December 2001. Photo by Fortum Power and Heat Oy,
Loviisa power plant.
Control rod drive mechanism protection pipes
A temperature measurement device insulation
of two other protection pipes were detected. These
and a protection pipe temporarily repaired in De-
cember 2001 were replaced with spare protection
pipes. An inspection using the UT method was
performed on all protection pipes.
The protection pipes of the control rod drive
mechanisms, attached to the reactor pressure ves-
sel head by bolted joints, are part of the primary
coolant pressure boundary. The measuring pockets
of the temperature measurement devices are weld-
ed onto the protection pipes and encased in asbes-
tos-insulated insulation shield boxes fixed by
welding. The upper end of an insulation shield box
is not fully leak-proof and moisture could enter
the structure. In the annual maintenance outage,
a sample was taken to further investigate the
protection pipe that had failed in December 2001.
The cracked area (40 × 40 mm2) was found out to
contain several branched cracks the inner surface
length of one of which was 3 mm. The defects are
caused by chloride-induced stress corrosion crack-
ing propagating through the grains. Water has
entered the insulation shield box and dissolved
chlorides contained in small amounts in the ther-
mal insulation. The growth of the cracks has taken
several years. Temperature is below 80°C but
chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking is possi-
ble in oxidizing environments.
Figs A6.1 and A6.2. show the location of tem-
perature measurement devices and leak detection
by crystallised boric acid.
No inspections were carried out in the 2002
annual maintenance outage of Loviisa 1 since the
cracking detected in December 2001 was believed
to be a single case due to the less aggressive
environmental conditions inside the protection
pipes. Most protection pipes in Loviisa 1 and some
protection pipes in Loviisa 2 will be inspected in
the 2003 outage using a UT method optimised for
stress corrosion cracking detection.
The protection pipes have a wall thickness
significantly higher than required in the dimen-
sioning standard. Even if the crack grew up to the
full length of the insulation shield box (135 mm) it
would not lead to the rupture of the pipe but
would be detected while still a small leak from the
primary circuit.
After the detection of the leak in December the
licensee implemented intensified leak monitoring
at both plant units, which will be continued for the
time being. All protection pipes are visually
checked at least every two weeks. Even very small
leaks are detectable by crystallised boric acid.
Potential degradation would not endanger plant
safety but, if a leak occurred, the plant would have
to be placed in cold shutdown for repairs.
Reactor core basket failures at Loviisa 2
In inspections during the Loviisa 2 annual main-
tenance outage, small cracks were found in the
liner plate of the core basket belonging to the reac-
tor pressure vessel internals. In addition, some of
the liner plate’s fastening screws were not quite
tightly screwed down and some screws were dam-
aged.
The lower end of the fuel rests on holes of the
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Figure A6.3. A diagrammatic drawing of the mounting
of the liner plate of the reactor core basket.
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core basket’s bottom plate. The core basket walls
are lined with a liner plate profiled to the edge of
the reactor core to guide the coolant flow. The
bottom part of the liner plate is welded onto the
lowest support ring attached to the core basket
shell. The plate is fastened to the topmost four
support rings by 312 embedded screws. The screws
sit on a washer onto which they were welded
during installation and evened out. The structure
allows vertical relative shifts between the liner
plate and the core basket. Fig. A6.3 illustrates the
mounting of the core basket’s liner plate.
The reactor pressure vessel internals are in-
spected every four years. Due to the high radiation
level, the core basket is inspected using a sub-
merged TV camera. A new camera was used in the
2002 inspection, which yields a better picture than
the old one. Owing to the deviations detected, the
scope of the TV camera inspection was extended
from 25% to all screws. In addition, screw height
in relation to formed plate was measured by a
special laser-based device. To assure their integri-
ty, the screws were inspected by ultrasonic testing
as well.
Some 50 screws were not quite completely
tightened against the liner plate. Ultrasonic test-
ing revealed five damaged screws, none of which
was entirely broken. A dent had been made in the
liner plate during installation to remove a gap
between the washer and the liner plate to help
keep them in place even during breaking.
Sliding between the liner plate of the core
basket and the screw is likely not to have taken
place as planned. At the time of the construction of
Loviisa 2, the liner plate had had to be repaired,
which may have contributed to the failure of the
screws. In addition, irradiation-assisted stress cor-
rosion may have contributed to the growth of the
failures.
The breaking of a few screws does not risk the
liner plate’s staying in place. If a screw with
washer comes off during an annual maintenance
outage, it could end up in the reactor and, if worst
comes to the worst, it could reduce coolant flow in
one fuel assembly and lead to loss of fuel cladding
tightness. The screws cannot fall into the reactor
during the plant’s operation. The licensee ascer-
tained that the damaged screws were in place
after the installation in its place of the core basket
and prior to the loading of the fuel assemblies and
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dummy elements. In future annual maintenance
outages at both plant units, the utility will ascer-
tain the staying in place of the screws if an
adjacent fuel assembly or a dummy element is
removed during refuelling.
Some 30 cracks were detected in the liner plate
near the screws, the largest being 15 mm long.
Their likely cause was irradiation-assisted stress
corrosion cracking. The high residual stresses and
cold working, which made the degradation mecha-
nism possible, were caused by the removal of the
screw gaps. Forces caused by the pre-tightening of
the screws may have further increased the stress-
es. Crack growth has stopped when stresses have
decreased further away from the screws. Small
cracks do not compromise the function of the liner
plate, or its staying in place.
Olkiluoto power plant
Diesel fuel oil cloud point limit in a storage
tank was exceeded
On 17 January 2002 it was found out at Olkiluoto
plant that the cloud point temperature of diesel
fuel oil in the fuel oil storage tank of stand-by
diesel generators exceeded the limit value set in
the Technical Specifications. The cloud point of oil
at Olkiluoto 1 and 2 deviated from the maximum
–24°C value of the Technical Specifications by one
degree and five degrees, respectively. The licensee
immediately undertook measures to restore the
required value. The fuel oil was replaced by an oil
grade whose cloud point was significantly lower
than required. The cloud point values of oil com-
plied with the Technical Specifications the next
day and it was thus not necessary to stop the oper-
ation of the plant units.
Both Olkiluoto plant units have four stand-by
diesel generators automatically starting up to sup-
ply the power required by the plant units in a
situation where a unit’s offsite and onsite power
supply has been lost. There is an onsite fuel oil day
tank for each diesel generator containing fuel oil
up to about seven hours operation. The tanks are
filled from storage tanks specific to each plant
unit and located in the plant outdoor area. The
storage tanks and the parts of the of the piping
leading to the day tanks in the outdoor area are
thermally insulated. In addition, the connecting
piping is equipped with heating cables to ensure
the fuel oil does not solidify even in extremely cold
temperatures. The cloud point value indicates the
lowest fuel oil storage temperature.
The deviating cloud point value was detected
on the basis of the results of biannual fuel oil
analyses. When the matter was looked into it was
found out that the allowable cloud point value in
the chemistry manual of the licensee, against
which the analysis results were compared, exceed-
ed by one degree the limit value of the Technical
Specifications. The deviation was discovered when
the result of Olkiluoto 2’s fuel oil analysis deviated
from the limit value of the chemistry manual. The
deviating values were due to the fact that in 1998
cloud point value was included in the Technical
Specifications as a new limit value but the old
limit value in the chemistry manual was not
changed.
The event was classified Level 0 on the INES
Scale.
On account of the event, an oil grade having a
lower cloud point was introduced at Olkiluoto
plant and the licensee checked some of the proce-
dures for the receipt of oil deliveries. In addition,
attention was paid to procedures ensuring the
post-amendment uniformity of guidelines specific
to different fields of technology and the Technical
Specifications.
Moving of plotter displays from the main
control room to a relay room was not in
compliance with the Technical
Specifications
In the Olkiluoto annual maintenances of 2001, the
plotter displays of some measurement points had
been moved from the control rooms to the adjacent
I&C rooms. During the work’s planning it went
unnoticed that the Technical Specifications require
the displays in question must be readable in the
control room. The licensee detected the situation
on 21 February 2002.
By means of the plotter displays moved to the
relay room i.a. the containment inner pressure,
temperature and radiation dose rate are moni-
tored during an accident situation. The data yield-
ed by the measurement points is used, for exam-
ple, to assess the moment of a radioactive release
in an accident situation or the radiation dose rates
occurring in the environment in consequence of an
58
S T U K - B - Y TO 2 2 4 SIGNIFICANT OPERATIONAL EVENTS APPENDIX 6
accident. These data are also readable on the
control room process computer. Some of the meas-
urement point displays are available for use also
by the emergency organisation in the fallout shel-
ter.
The event was classified INES Level 0.
The supervision of modifications at Olkiluoto
plant had already been intensified before this
event by the introduction of a review procedure.
The procedure brings all planned modifications to
the knowledge of those responsible for the Techni-
cal Specifications better than before.
On the application of the licensee, STUK later
approved a change to the Technical Specifications
allowing the plotter displays in question in an I&C
room adjacent to the control room.
Olkiluoto 1 reactor scram
In consequence of a disturbance in the national
400 kV power transmission grid, a reactor scram
occurred at Olkiluoto 1 on 20 April 2002. The plant
unit was in full power operation at the time of the
event. The event was attributed to the erroneous
opening of feeder circuit breakers at the nearby
Rauma 400 kV switchyard during the investiga-
tion of a fault alarm signal. This caused a loss of
load at Olkiluoto 1.
Electrical power supply from Olkiluoto 1 had
been connected to the national grid via the Rauma
switchyard, along one power transmission line.
The first circuit-breaker, i.e. the plant switch, is in
the 400 kV switchyard of Olkiluoto plant. In
addition, there are feeder circuit-breakers at both
ends of the power transmission line connecting
the Olkiluoto and Rauma switchyards. In case of a
grid disturbance, a signal is transmitted to the
protection system indicating that a plant switch
has opened. In such a situation the plant unit tries
to switch to house turbine operation by lowering
the reactor power. In addition, when the Olkiluo-
to–Rauma power transmission line trips, a protec-
tive signal is obtained, making possible changeo-
ver to onsite power supply. The function is a
limited one, however, and does not cover all fault
situations.
When the feeder circuit-breakers at the Rauma
switchyard opened, the signal to reduce reactor
power after loss of load, which is essential for
Olkiluoto 1’s changeover to onsite power supply,
was not received because the circuit-breakers had
opened due to human error and not due to an
actual transmission line fault. In addition, the
changing over of the plant unit’s power supply to
the available 110 kV offsite grid failed because
there were no prerequisites for the changeover
due to large voltage and frequency swings. The
control valves of a high pressure turbine closed
and its bypass valves opened to limit the turbine’s
operating speed. In consequence of the closing of
the control valves, reactor pressure momentarily
increased, causing reactor power to increase.
Which, for its part, brought the main circulation
pumps to minimum operating speed to reduce
reactor power to allowable level. As a consequence,
a reactor scram occurred and the isolation valves
of a steam line closed. Furthermore, the reactor
safety valves opened and the standby diesel gener-
ators started. For a while, power supply to safety
systems was taken care of by the standby diesel
generators only, until the connection to the 110 kV
grid was resumed. The plant unit’s all safety
systems operated as designed during the tran-
sient.
The event was assigned Level 0 on the INES
Scale.
One leaking valve was found in the post-scram
leak tightness test of the isolation valves. The
valve was repaired and the plant unit resumed
electricity generation on 22 April 2002.
In the design of the plant unit’s control systems
the fact has not been considered that, when elec-
tric power is fed to the national 400 kV power
transmission grid along one power transmission
line only, the signal decreasing reactor power may
not be transmitted in a loss-of-load situation. After
the event the facility’s power supply to the 400 kV
power transmission grid was changed, for the
present, to take place such that both Olkiluoto
plant units feed the electric power they have
generated to the power transmission grid along
three 400 kV power transmission lines, making
recurrence of the above event impossible. In coop-
eration with Fingrid Plc, the licensee has launched
an investigation into the protection signals needed
in a loss-of-grid situation. The implementation of
possible improvements is due to start in the 2003
annual maintenance outages.
The licensee has given additional operator
training due to the event.
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Two fuel assemblies were erroneously
moved at Olkiluoto 1
In the 2002 Olkiluoto 1 annual maintenance, the
moving of two fuel assemblies did not comply with
the Technical Specifications.
The reactor cores of both Olkiluoto plant units
contain 500 fuel assemblies a fourth part of which
is replaced yearly. In addition, the positions in the
core of the remaining assemblies are rearranged.
To assure the maintenance of reactor subcriticali-
ty, the fuel rearrangement order is carefully
planned in advance.
Control rod drive mechanism maintenance is
performed simultaneously with fuel unloading
from the reactor. Control rods are withdrawn from
the core for maintenance so as to detach the drive
mechanisms located below them. The control rods
are cruciform in cross-section and they plus their
four surrounding fuel assemblies form a super
cell. According to the Technical Specifications, the
fuel assemblies in a super cell must not be moved
while the control rod drive mechanism belonging
to it is being serviced.
In this annual maintenance outage, fuel un-
loading from the reactor and the maintenance of
control rod drives mechanisms had been started
on 15 May 2002. After a shift change, fuel unload-
ing was continued according to a fuel rearrange-
ment list and on 16 May a.m. two fuel assemblies
were removed from a super cell near to the edge of
the reactor core. Since the maintenance of the
control rod drive mechanism of the super cell in
question was still underway, the assemblies should
not have been moved as yet. This escaped the
notice of the individual supervising the refuelling,
however.
The event did not endanger nuclear criticality
safety but, on the contrary, the removal of fuel
from the reactor increased subcriticality. However,
the event was an indication of the vulnerability of
administrative barriers. The licensee will make
procedures and training more specific to prevent
similar events.
The event was classified Level 0 on the INES
Scale.
Partial inactivity of the neutron flux
measuring system
In tests conducted after the annual maintenance
of Olkiluoto 1 on 27 May 2002 it was found out
that two safety limits of the reactor core neutron
flux measuring system were not functioning as
designed. The measuring system monitors the
neutron flux during reactor start-up. The tests
were considered necessary because of the experi-
ences gained during start-up from the previous
Olkiluoto 2 annual maintenance. One of the inac-
tive safety limits stops control rod withdrawal
from the reactor and the other trips the scram
function.
Another system monitors the neutron flux dur-
ing power operation and activates when reactor
power exceeds 10% of rated power. Safety limits
inactive in the start-up phase are designed to
protect the reactor if the power operation monitor-
ing function fails to start properly. In this case the
neutron flux measuring function of the relevant
power range was fully operational.
The inactivity of the safety limits was due to
the signal level of the start-up monitoring system,
which was too low to trip the safety limits. The
signal had become less prominent because the fuel
type and loading manner had been changed over
the years, which had changed also the reactor
power distribution. In addition, the voltage of the
monitoring system’s neutron detectors had been
changed to improve their endurance. Tests relat-
ing to the modifications did not include checking
of the correct functioning of the safety limits in
question. Fuel loading had changed also at
Olkiluoto 2 and the voltage of neutron detectors
had been changed the same way as at Olkiluoto 1,
making corresponding safety limits inoperative at
Olkiluoto 2 since the annual maintenance outage
that ended on 13 May 2002.
The event was classified Level 1 on the INES
Scale.
The licensee calculated new values for the
protection limits to make them function within
the correct power range. The modified limits were
programmed in the Olkiluoto 2 system before the
Midsummer outage and their operation was tested
during the outage. Olkiluoto 1 was similarly modi-
fied on 4 July 2002 and the functioning of the
limits will be ascertained in the next outage. The
protection limits of the start-up range monitoring
system are only needed in the next outage.
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APPENDIX 7 Effect of component inoperability
on accident risk at nuclear power plants
As part of the nuclear safety indicator system,
STUK follows accident risk from component una-
vailability at nuclear power plants. Three types of
event cause component unavailability, namely:
component failures, preventive maintenance, and
deviations from the Technical Specifications ap-
proved by STUK. The share of assessed accident
risk from component inoperabilities at the Loviisa
and Olkiluoto plant units in 1995–2002 is given in
Figs. A7.1–A7.6. The results for 2002 are tentative.
STUK began to monitor systematic risk from com-
ponent unavailability in 1995. The objective is that
the effect of component unavailability on annual
risk is less than 5% of the basic annual level of
risk analysed for severe accidents.
To facilitate analysis, conservative assumptions
and simplifications have been used for the risk
calculations, which essentially weaken the usabili-
ty of the results for trend monitoring and compari-
son-making between plants. If, over the years, the
average risk-significance of unavailability is as
estimated, annual fluctuations can be ignored. If
risk from the unavailability of one or more compo-
nents significantly increases in comparison with
how things were earlier, it will be necessary to
closer examine the cause of the change.
Those component unavailabilities at Loviisa
facility most significant for accident risk were
mostly caused by maintenance procedures on the
back-up emergency feed water system. Accident
risk from component unavailability at Olkiluoto
facility was mostly due to latent diesel generator
defects and errors in the maintenance of the sea
water system.
The component unavailabilities in 2002 did not
require any specific STUK actions although the
5% target value (the sum of the aforementioned
three areas) for Loviisa 1 and Olkiluoto 1 was
exceeded.
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Figure A7.6. Effect of plant conditions in non-compli-
ance with the Technical Specifications on accident risk
at the Olkiluoto plant units.
Figure A7.5. Effect of component preventive mainte-
nance on accident risk at the Olkiluoto plant units.
Figure A7.4. Effect of component failures on accident
risk at the Loviisa plant units.
Figure A7.3. Effect of plant conditions in non-compli-
ance with the Technical Specifications on accident risk
at the Loviisa plant units.
Figure A7.2. Effect of component preventive mainte-
nance on accident risk at the Loviisa plant units.
Figure A7.1. Effect of component failures on accident
risk at the Loviisa plant units.
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APPENDIX 8 STUK’s safety research projects
completed in 2002
Nuclear power plants
Research projects included in FINNUS
Structural analysis of pipe experiments using PAr-
allel Channel TEst Loop (PACTEL)-facility; VTT
Manufacturing Technology
FRAPTRAN-code: Development of FRAPTRAN-
GENFLO code; VTT Energy
FRAPTRAN-code: Application of statistical calcu-
lation methods in the FRAPCON 3-FRAPTRAN-
codes; VTT Energy
Development of fuel analysis capabilities; valida-
tion of FRAPTRAN-GENFLO-code by using a
BWR-oscillation transient; VTT Energy
The application of new reactor physics models in
criticality safety calculations, a continuation
project; VTT Energy
Environmentally assisted cracking of NPP materi-
als, a continuation project; VTT Manufacturing
Technology
Fuel cladding corrosion mechanism and its model-
ling, a continuation project; VTT Manufacturing
Technology
Modelling of the behaviour of oxide films with re-
gard to their role in activity buildup and different
corrosion phenomena in NPPs, a continuation
project; VTT Manufacturing Technology
A survey of organizational culture in Finnish NPP
maintenance; VTT Automation
Reliability assessment and FMEA of programma-
ble automation, a continuation project; VTT Auto-
mation
Participation in the Thermal-Hydraulic Code Ap-
plications and Maintenance Program (CAMP) in
2002; VTT Energy
Risk-informed quality assuarance; VTT Industrial
Systems
Organizational culture in Finnish NPP mainte-
nance; Development of an assessment method;
VTT Industrial Systems
Analysis of and data collection on human errors;
VTT Industrial Systems
Analysis and combination of deterministic and
probabilistic data for use as a basis for decision-
making; Quality requirements of PSA and qualify-
ing as part of a risk-informed decision-making
process; VTT Automation
Analysis and combination of deterministic and
probabilistic data for use as a basis for decision-
making; Probabilistic and deterministic decision-
making criteria and their usage; VTT Automation
Risk-informed management of ageing and mainte-
nance; Probabilistic assessment of pipe leakages
and ruptures to support risk-informed decision-
making; VTT Automation
Human reliability analysis (HRA); Errors of com-
mission, gathering reliability data and analysis of
fires integrated with HRA; VTT Automation
Risk-informed periodic inspections; VTT Manufac-
turing Technology
Usage of modelling in ultrasonic testing; VTT
Manufacturing Technology
Development of dose calculation pertaining to
NPP normal releases; VTT Energy
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Research activities pertaining to regulatory
decision-making
Development of NDT qualification; Co-operation
in the qualification of NDT-systems in Finland.
Review of qualification of inspection procedures
for manual ultrasonic inspection of pipeline butt
welds at the OL1- and OL2-NPP; Serco Assurance
Ltd
Analysis of EMC-phenomena based risks at Finn-
ish NPPs; Nemko Product Services Oy
Fire analysis of Loviisa NPP turbine hall; VTT
Energy
ATRIUM 10-fuel; Assessment of behaviour during
normal use with statistical methods; VTT Process-
es
Transient analysis related to upgrading of fuel
burn-up; VTT Processes
Research to improve safety regulation
Improvement of process-oriented leadership in the
nuclear safety regulation carried out by STUK;
Qualitas Fennica Oy
Nuclear waste management
Research projects included in KYT
DECOVALEX III; Bench Mark Test 2 simulations
in 2001; Uppsala University
Matrix Diffusion Cluster; Treatment of geosphere
retention processes in safety assessments: meas-
urement and modeling of matrix diffusion; Uni-
versity of Helsinki, Laboratory of Radiochemistry.
Interpretation of disturbance structures in
Holocene submarine sediments in the Olkiluoto
area, the Gulf of Bothnia, Baltic Sea, using a high
resolution echo-sounding profiles; laboratory anal-
yses of sedimentary samples; Geological Survey of
Finland.
IAEA coordinated research project (CRP). Natural
geochemical concentrations and fluxes on the Bal-
tic shield in Finland as indicators on nuclear waste
repository safety; year 2001 b); University of Read-
ing
Development and validation of physical rock ma-
trix characterization methods and their applica-
tion in site investigations, natural analogue stud-
ies and performance assessment; Tasks 3 & 4. Prof.
Dr. K. Meyer; BAM
Seabed gasinvestigations at Olkiluoto site; Geo-
logical Survey of Finland.
DECOVALEX III; The Termo-Hydro-Mechanical
modelling of bentonite; Helsinki University of
Technology, Institute of Mathematics.
DECOVALEX III; Calculation method for the me-
chanical stability of nuclear waste canister dispos-
al. Helsinki University of Technology, Institute of
Mathematics.
DECOVALEX III; Bench Mark Test 2 simulations
in 2002; Uppsala University
DECOVALEX III; Benchmark Test 2, rock me-
chanical simulations in 2002. Helsinki University
of Technology, Department of Materials Science
and Rock Engineering.
Research pertaining to regulatory decisions
Review of Posiva’s R&D programme; Carrera;
UPC-ETMC
Review of the GPS deformation monitoring stud-
ies commissioned by Posiva Oy on the Olkiluoto,
Kivetty and Romuvaara sites, 1994-2000. Helsinki
University of Technology, Department of Survey-
ing.
Focused modelling of bedrock fracture zones in
Olkiluoto; Geological Survey of Finland.
The development of 3D Rock modelling system;
VTT Building and Transport.
Review of the estimation of rock movements due
to future earthquakes at four candidate sites for a
spent fuel repository in Finland; Helsinki Univer-
sity of Technology, Department of Materials Sci-
ence and Rock Engineering.
